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As an important force in most societies, religion can and does 
have a huge impact on questions of development - What is the rel-
evance of religion in development? How does religion influence 
the decisions we make in relation to development? And what effect 
does faith have on how individuals experience development? It 
was to look at these relationships that the Chair for Religion and 
Development was established 10 years ago. For ISS it was an impor-
tant addition to our research activities, filling a void in our aca-
demic work.
But a Chair is only as good as the people who work on it. We 
have been very lucky that Professor Gerrie ter Haar has occupied 
the Chair for the past 10 years. She has not only published a vast 
amount of literature on the importance of religion to development, 
she has also built an important global network of scholars and prac-
titioners who move research and practice in this field forward. She 
has looked, both alone and with others, at the relevance of religion 
on conflict, on migration – both forced and voluntary – on identity 
and how these relate to development. 
This compilation brings together in one booklet some of Professor 
Ter Haar’s most important essays and papers on the theme of reli-
gion and development - a ‘taster’ of the work she has produced over 
the past 10 years. It introduces the novice to Professor Ter Haar’s 
work and reminds the more experienced scholar of some of the 
important work she has produced over the past decade.  
On behalf of the ISS Community I congratulate Professor Ter Haar 
with this success. The Board of the Foundation, chaired by WCRP, 
and the Advisory Council of the Chair are to be complimented on 
their foresight and their support. ISS thanks Cordaid and ICCO for 
their intellectual and financial underpinning of the Chair.
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Rats, Cockroaches and People Like Us
Rector,
Members of the Board of Trustees,
Trustees of the External Chair ‘Religion, Human Rights and Social Change’
Excellencies, distinguished colleagues and students of the ISS, ladies and 
gentlemen,
People like me: 
Many people appear to believe that there are a growing number 
of religious conflicts in the world, particularly since the end of 
the Cold War.  On closer examination, however, it seems that the 
number of conflicts of the type which are today often labelled 
‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’ has in fact been growing since the 1950s1.  
Many such conflicts were already detectable in the period of the 
Cold War, but at that time, they were usually interpreted within a 
framework of East-West re lations.    
There has, without doubt, been a change in the patterns of violent 
conflict in the world since the end of the Cold War, but above all 
there has been a massive shift in perceptions. Among the world’s 
recent conflicts which are now seen as primarily religious in nature 
are, for example, Bosnia, Algeria, Kashmir, Chechnya, Indonesia 
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and others.  This development is one reason for a growing inter-
est in religion in relation to human rights, a subject which, it may 
even be argued, has been one of the main features of the human 
rights debate in recent years.2  Many people in the West, where 
secular politics are considered the norm, seem to have come to the 
conclusion that religion is all too often a negative aspect of human 
culture, that it divides people rather than unites them.  As a result, 
there exists a widely-held belief today that religion is responsible 
for abuses of human rights more often than it is a factor in their 
protection.   
This contrasts rather sharply with the period before the 1990s, 
when academics as well as policymakers often failed to appreci-
ate the significance of religion in the political realm because of 
an undiscriminating belief in the inevitability of secularization. 
We may now see that secular pressures often in fact strengthen 
religious belief.3 The emergence of a worldwide vibrant political 
Islam may be considered as one telling example; similar tendencies 
towards a return to the fundamentals of faith can also be discerned 
within other major religious traditions.4   
Some views of human rights
Until the last years of the twentieth century, secularism appeared 
to political elites throughout the world to be an unstoppable force, 
and human rights to be very largely a matter of legislation.  Hence, 
in the academic field, the debate on human rights, including in 
matters concerning religion, has been dominated by experts on 
international law and other jurists. On occasion, theologians and 
scholars of religion have also added their voices, but without devel-
oping any systematic analysis of the relationship between religion 
and human rights.  Systematic thought has been more forthcoming 
from ethical philosophers, both in the Western and non-Western 
world.5  A contribution from this quarter is hardly surprising con-
sidering that the moral dimension of human activity is of central 
concern to the human rights debate.  
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Nowhere do these remarks apply with greater pertinence than in 
discussion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
This is now often interpreted primarily as a legal document, which 
no doubt for this reason has received most attention from schol-
ars working within the field of law. In retrospect, more than fifty 
years after the Declaration, it is becoming clear that legal instru-
ments are not enough if human rights are to be firmly grounded 
in different cultures, as people’s understanding of human rights is 
informed by their own world views and cosmologies. It is plain that 
in many countries human rights ideology finds its theoretical jus-
tification in religion.  Yet, the human rights concept as expressed 
in the Universal Declaration is at root a secular idea.  For it seems 
that of all the cultural factors which affect views of humanity 
and human rights in different parts of the world, none is more 
important than religion.  It is as a consequence of such different 
viewpoints that today a number of other human rights declarations 
exist which reflect the particular world view of their designers.6 
Although the emergence of alternative declarations has often been 
politically inspired, the fact that the Universal Declaration con-
ceives human rights in a purely secular mode is nevertheless a mat-
ter of genuine concern for many otherwise sympathetic observers, 
notably outside the Western world.7 
Clearly, if we wish for a successful inculturation of human rights, 
we must give serious thought to the role played by religion.8  For 
most people in the world, religion is an integral part of their exist-
ence, inseparable from the social and moral order, and it defines 
their relations with other human beings. If relations between 
human beings are central to the concept of human rights, it 
becomes important to consider whether, in any given society, these 
relations have been informed by a religious world view or whether 
the philosophical basis is a secular one. In the case of the former, 
believers often feel that the way in which they perceive the world 
does not find sufficient recognition in the Universal Declaration. 
We may say, with hindsight, that the Universal Declaration is itself 
a product of the secular developments that I referred to earlier on. 
The phrase ‘human rights’, after all, implies two separate concepts: 
the existence of human beings, and the assertion that they have 
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inalienable rights. Scholarly debate on the Universal Declaration 
invariably turns upon the nature of these rights and ways of apply-
ing them, without questioning the notion of a human being. That 
is, in addressing the fundamental question of a human’s rights 
and the universal application of these, the Declaration takes it for 
granted that we all agree upon what precisely is a human being. 
The question regarding the actual nature of a human being is in 
many cases deemed to be a metaphysical one, and is therefore 
often expressed in religion.  To avoid any misunderstanding, I am 
not arguing that there is anything fundamentally flawed in the 
Universal Declaration; what I am saying is that in view of what we 
know now, one may consider that perhaps it is simply not explicit 
enough in certain areas. In the view of many, it lacks a profound 
view of what a human being is. 
Interestingly, the same point has recently been made by Vaclav 
Havel, when he asks why human beings have the prerogative to 
enjoy human rights. The answer he has advanced resembles that 
of many non-Western critics. ‘I am convinced’, he states, ‘ that the 
deepest roots of what we now call human rights lie somewhere 
beyond us, and above us; somewhere deeper than the world of 
human covenants - a realm that I would, for simplicity’s sake, 
describe as metaphysical’.9 One viable course, in his view,  out of 
the problems that may arise from a difference in world view over 
the interpretation of human rights, is placing emphasis on their 
spiritual source. We should make an effort, he argues, to highlight 
the spiritual dimension and spiritual origin of the values guarded 
by the United Nations and translate this into the Organization’s 
practical activities.10 Whatever our personal views on this may be, 
it seems evident that present circumstances require a rethinking of 
the relationship between religion and human rights. This is neces-
sary in order to address some of the changes that have taken place 
in recent decades and which have shed new light on the role of reli-
gion in human rights matters. 
Consideration of the place of religion in the social and politi-
cal circumstances of today’s world raises a number of important 
questions, not all of which can be discussed here and now.  I will 
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limit myself to discussing only those points which I believe need 
our most urgent scholarly attention. I will mention three in this 
address, which I will discuss in a particular order.  I will begin with 
the most widely recognized of the debates raised by notions of glo-
balization in regard to human rights, namely the issue of cultural 
relativism.  Second, I will review the relationship between religion 
and culture, which, in my view, takes the inquiry further.  Finally, I 
will conclude with what seems to me to lie at the heart of the mat-
ter, namely the way in which many of the world’s people conceive 
of a human being in partly spiritual terms. The third and last of 
these points is particularly important since the question of human 
rights is bound up with a given society’s fundamental view of what 
one author refers to as ‘what sort of thing a human being is’11.  This 
really is a consideration of the elements which separate human 
beings from other categories and by virtue of which they may enjoy 
certain rights.  
Cultural relativism 
The task of providing a common moral language for all humanity is 
fraught with difficulties. The central paradox here is that achieving 
such a goal requires a prior development of an indigenous human 
rights language within the various moral traditions of the world.12 
Given the state of affairs in the world today, there is increasing 
doubt as to whether a worldwide consensus on human rights can 
ever be achieved. In a controversial essay published in 1993 Samuel 
Huntington suggested that certain differences between peoples and 
populations can never be bridged.13 His argument is that there is 
a fundamental incompatibility between different types of civiliza-
tion, whose traditions have been shaped over centuries. The most 
important source of conflict in the world today, in his view, is not 
ideological or economic but cultural. According to Huntington, 
we are experiencing a clash of civilizations in the world, in which 
religion plays a major role. Since there is no prospect of unity being 
created out of the world’s cultural diversity, he proposes that the 
Western world should accept that these cultural ‘fault lines’ exist.  
Western countries should therefore rather strive for unity within 
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their own cultural field, and cooperate primarily with those whose 
cultures are closest to their own.  
Huntington’s line of thought, which has been influential though 
much-criticized,14 is at odds with the vision of the Universal 
Declaration, which maintains that there are certain values which 
are shared by all peoples.15 Huntington’s outlook, however, stands 
in a long tradition. I may cite, for example, the precedent offered 
by the American Anthropological Society which in 1947 opposed 
the adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the 
grounds that individual cultures had their own standards and val-
ues, and later accused the drafters of ethnocentrism.16 American 
anthropologists of fifty years ago, like Samuel Huntington today, 
found it hard to believe that human beings may find ways to tran-
scend their cultural divides. Rather than the cultural fault lines 
identified by Huntington, the vision embodied in the Universal 
Declaration acknowledges the existence of a cultural weave under-
lying a common human pattern. If we accept this to be so, it means 
that in human rights thinking the human is the fundamental 
category, and not culture.17 Such matters are ultimately a matter 
of faith, which is why belief in the universality of human rights is 
sometimes referred to as a secular religion.
In view of this type of culturalist critique, it is important to remind 
ourselves that the Universal Declaration was the work of a team of 
both Western and non-Western drafters, standing in different reli-
gious traditions. The core group of eight drafters comprised repre-
sentatives from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the former 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.18  In the 
final phase, only eight of the 58 states involved in the process decid-
ed to abstain from voting on adoption of the Declaration, including 
South Africa, the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia.19 It is significant 
that none of the dissenters voted against the Declaration. 
The drafters of this document clearly considered how to make a 
universal appeal to people of different cultures, for their aim was 
to communicate a vision to ordinary people, men and women from  
all walks of life in all parts of the world. Such a vision has great 
mobilizing power, which is precisely what governments and others 
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wielding political power often fear in the Universal Declaration. 
Its claim to universality, I would argue, lies much more in its con-
viction that it can be shared by all people, whoever and wherever 
they are, than in the likelihood that its principles will actually be 
respected by political elites. The principal aim of the Declaration 
was thus an educational one: every person was to be aware of cer-
tain fundamental values in order to prevent a repeat of the horrors 
which had occurred during the Second World War with its 50 mil-
lion dead, only months before the Declaration was drafted. 
In his book Modernity and the Holocaust the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman has argued that the atrocities of the Second World War 
were made possible by the systematic repression of the moral 
dimension of people’s acts in modern industrial society.20  If this is 
so, it is all the more disturbing because ‘modernity’, as it is often 
referred to,21 has today made inroads in all societies worldwide.  
The globalization of life which has accompanied modernity has 
given a new impulse to the debate on universalism versus particu-
larism in human rights. The argument in favour of universality 
may be strengthened by the observation that in a globalized world, 
norms and values are likely to be influenced by the process of glo-
balization. On the other hand, it is increasingly argued outside the 
Western world, by politicians especially, that globalization threat-
ens the specific identity of individual societies. Every country there-
fore (or so it is argued) should be allowed to develop its own partic-
ular philosophy of human rights, based on its own cultural values. 
In many cases this is explicitly related to the religious morality of 
a particular culture or society. The Islamic Declaration on Human 
Rights is one example. Another is the Bangkok Declaration, drafted 
in the early 1990s by some forty states from the Asian and Pacific 
region, which made a plea to consider ‘the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds’ in interpreting and applying human rights.22 
Culture-related values, however, as feminist writers especially have 
pointed out, can be very oppressive for social and religious minori-
ties inasmuch as they tend to deny cultural and religious diversity 
within a given society.23 
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It is notable that a related debate has arisen in Western societies, 
such as Europe and North America, in the form of the heated issue 
of multiculturalism. The argument here turns upon the degree to 
which our societies should encourage minority groups to nurture 
specific cultural and religious identities. Inherent in this is a per-
ception similar to that of the Islamic and Asian activists whom I 
have just mentioned: namely, that certain groups of people are so 
different from us as to require different treatment, in conformity 
with those norms and values which are deemed to be their own. 
Some influential analysts, including Kwame Anthony Appiah and 
Michael Ignatieff, have labelled this view the ‘narcissism of minor 
difference’.24 Labelling people as ‘not like us’ always concerns mat-
ters of identity – who are we and who are they? The merits of the 
argument must be examined case by case. For example, I have 
argued elsewhere in regard to African immigrants in Europe that it 
is often Europeans, and not Africans themselves, who insist on the 
need for Africans to develop their own (meaning African) identity. 
In effect such an argument becomes a mechanism of exclusion, a 
discourse which contributes to the defence of Fortress Europe.25
Perceptions of human difference are inseparable from perceptions 
of identity. Whether we are discussing human rights in the inter-
national arena or group rights within multicultural societies, it 
is of crucial importance to establish who is the agent in defining 
people’s identities. Who precisely is advocating a position of excep-
tion, and for whom? Often, it is not the victims but the violators of 
human rights who use a relativist argument against the principle 
of universality.26 One instance is that of the late President Mobutu 
of Zaire, who argued that his country should be exempt from inter-
national norms on the grounds that Zaireans had their own authen-
tic way of doing things. Conversely, relatively powerless indigenous 
groups may seek to protect their communal rights by invoking uni-
versal values and associating themselves with global movements.27 
Any claim to exception of the sort I have described carries a risk 
of political manipulation. This includes claims made on religious 
grounds. The political manipulation of religion has been evident, 
for example, in the last Balkan wars, notably in forging a link 
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between religion and nationalism. Religious identities there gained 
an overriding importance in recent years as a result of the extreme 
violence of the conflict. It has been argued that it is not religion, 
but a ‘politics of identity’ which turned minor differences into 
major divides and set different believers against each other.28 This 
may equally prove true of situations of conflict between religious 
groups in other parts of the world where people previously lived in 
relative harmony. 
Conflict is often exacerbated when religion becomes a tool in the 
hands of politicians or political interest groups and is thus used to 
create, maintain or strengthen a factional position. It is the politi-
cal manipulation of religion which causes secularists to mistrust 
religiously inspired arguments about human rights. Indeed, there 
can be no doubt that religion may easily be associated with the 
violation of human rights. But this observation is not sufficient to 
disqualify religious belief as an instrument for the propagation and 
protection of human rights. In some countries it is argued that the 
secular ideology of the state is itself a root cause of, and not the 
solution to, religious violence, because it fails to take account of 
the religious values of citizens. This is the case in India, for exam-
ple, where some thoughtful scholars advocate the creation of a 
state based on the original Hindu tradition of religious tolerance.29 
The fact is that in any society where a substantial number of peo-
ple profess religious belief, religion has a role to play in protecting 
human rights, just as it can have a role in violating them. 
In other words, we should not deny the legitimacy of various socie-
ties developing their own methods for solving problems of human 
rights.30 In fact, sensitivity to cultural diversity is, in my view, a 
precondition for the successful inculturation of human rights. 
But cultural sensitivity – an open-mindedness about the potentials 
of unfamiliar cultures – is not the same as cultural relativism. 
Whereas the former makes possible a process of dialogue which can 
be mutually enriching, the latter leads to a separate development 
of human rights. 
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Religion and culture
The tendency to emphasize differences between cultures rather 
than to focus on what may bind them leads to some important 
philosophical questions. The most pressing of these is perhaps, in 
view of our subject, the question whether cultural particularism 
breeds moral particularism. In other words, if we adhere to the pri-
macy of cultural diversity, on the grounds that there exists a range 
of specific cultural identities, can we at the same time uphold the 
existence of moral standards which override a particular cultural 
tradition, such as those embedded in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights? If not, the only logical alternative is to believe that 
each culturally defined entity should adopt its own separate human 
rights standards. This, we may note, is the logical corollary of both 
Huntington’s argument about cultural difference and of the more 
extreme advocates of multiculturalism within Western societies. 
This is an unappealing prospect in my view. Rather, we should aim 
to develop global moral connections, asking ourselves what moral 
relationships a global culture creates. This has also been suggested 
by Michael Ignatieff, who calls for a type of involvement which will 
be ‘a crucial new feature of the modern moral imagination’.31 Since 
religion is the idiom in which many people express their views 
about the world, it will need to be part of such a moral imagina-
tion.
I should say at this juncture that the conventional Western idea 
of what religion is, and the way we apply this to the issue of 
human rights, has been much influenced by the so-called world 
religions.32  The concept of world religions is normally applied to 
religions based on a written authority, notably Christianity and 
Islam. Scholars and others often contrast these with so-called ethnic 
religions, usually meaning in effect religions which have no sacred 
book but which are based on oral traditions. In such a classifica-
tion, ‘ethnic religions’ are connected to a specific ethnic group or 
‘tribe’ and its culture. Such notions were coined during colonial 
times by the West in regard to people not like us, and are intrinsi-
cally connected to concepts of race. In our time, the concept of eth-
nicity has come to replace the nineteenth-century concept of race 
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in the definition of perceived differences between human popula-
tions.33 The main attraction of using the term ‘ethnic’ appears to lie 
in its usefulness in the process of ‘othering’, that is in distinguish-
ing systematically between ‘us’ and ‘them’.34  In the same vein, 
ethnic religions tend to be regarded as innate, closed and static 
in character, and thus different from world religions, which are 
deemed open to all peoples and conscious of a universal vocation.35 
This view, although conventional, is today in dire need of revision, 
not only because it is not congruent with observable facts, but also 
because it gives comfort to cultural relativists. ‘World’ or ‘universal’ 
religions have developed firm roots in local cultures around the 
world as a consequence of modern processes of globalization. An 
unprecedented diversity has arisen within these religions, which is 
evidenced by popular forms of religious expression. In such cases, 
interpretation of scripture is increasingly adapted to the local 
context of the believers. At the same time, a movement has taken 
place in the opposite sense, as so-called ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ religions 
are increasingly taking on universal characteristics. This is so, for 
example, with African traditional religions, which can be found 
in various parts of the world.36 Formerly this was a consequence 
of the transatlantic slave trade; today African religious traditions 
have travelled overseas through the international migration that is 
a hallmark of modern globalization. Yoruba religion is now more 
flourishing in New York than in Lagos. Muslim brotherhoods are 
making converts in Chicago and are firmly established in southern 
Europe. There are churches founded by Africans which have now 
become international, and which have branches a few kilometres 
from where we are now sitting.37 Processes of inculturation and con-
textualization have caused so-called world religions and ethnic reli-
gions to resemble each other more closely in structure. Both have 
become grounded in the particular culture where they are being 
practiced, all over the world.
These dynamics of change need to be considered in any up-to-date 
analysis of the relationship between religion and human rights. 
Only then can we aim to make the global moral connections that 
are needed if basic human rights are to be upheld worldwide. 
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Being human
If anything can be said about the great diversity of religions in 
the world, it is that they all perceive good and evil to be part of 
the human condition. They concern themselves with exploring 
the nature of these qualities, the relationship between them, and 
methods of keeping these two forces under control. ‘The wise man’, 
states the Moroccan sociologist Muhammad Guessous, comment-
ing on what his fellow-countrymen believe to be the essence of a 
human being, ‘is the man who does not expect good things in this 
life but who takes precautions to minimize the evil.’38 
To minimize evil, Guessous observes, Moroccans believe that a per-
son needs to do two things: to work hard and to worship. Ora et lab-
ora, others might say. Most religious traditions recognize the need 
to worship in order to minimize evil, meaning everything which is 
seen as reducing the quality of human life, including illness, pov-
erty and death. Religious believers are ultimately aware that suc-
cessful living is dependent on their relationship with an invisible 
world, which they believe to be inhabited by spiritual forces that 
can make their presence felt in the visible world. Religious practice, 
therefore, consists to a large extent in a skillful manipulation of 
these unseen forces in order to manage the good and evil humans 
experience in their lives. 
All societies have some concept of evil, and of the way in which 
human beings are implicated. In many societies such ideas are 
expressed through discourses of religion. Accusations of witchcraft, 
for example, are one way in which people may express the notion 
that evil can take on a human form.39 The belief in witchcraft is 
a popular one, in the sense that it is widely held, notably but not 
only in Africa.  It expresses an essentially religious idea about 
human nature, which may find a different expression in other cul-
tures. For, even where religion has been abandoned as an explana-
tory model, secular ideologies have emerged which deal with the 
same question of how to manage and ward off manifestations of 
evil. 
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Both religious and secular ideologies tend to ascribe evil notably 
to those who are not considered people ‘like us’. Both types of 
ideology have shown a capacity to destroy the lives of others by 
placing them outside the category of humans. The way in which 
this happens may differ, but in all cases it implies some form of 
disqualification as a person. In 1914, the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace observed in relation to a war between Greece 
and Bulgaria that ‘Day after day the Bulgarians were represented in 
the Greek press as a race of monsters, and public feeling was roused 
to a pitch of chauvinism which made it inevitable that war, when it 
should come, should be ruthless.... Deny that your enemies are men 
and you will treat them as vermin’.40 Something similar happened 
during the Second World War, when whole groups were described 
as not fully human, not ‘people like us’. Anti-Arab pogroms in 1950s 
Algeria were known to French settlers as ‘ratonnades’ or ‘rat-hunts’. 
In preparation for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the organs of state 
and mass communication  consistently conveyed the message that 
part of the population were actually ‘cockroaches’.41 Examples from 
all parts of the world indicate how effective and how lethal dehu-
manising is as a mechanism of exclusion. It denies humanity to a 
person or a group. It is one extreme of the process of ‘othering’, or 
the constitution of a primal opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to recall, this is a process which takes 
place permanently in less radical forms in all societies. It is for that 
reason that minority groups are everywhere in a vulnerable posi-
tion. When their otherness becomes justified by an ideology either 
religious or secular, they risk different treatment on the grounds 
that they are, after all, different. Hence, they may be deemed to 
have fewer rights than people like us, or even no rights at all.
This clearly has major implications for human rights, which are 
claims that individuals are entitled to make simply by virtue of 
their status as human beings. It raises a question not so much 
about the nature of rights, as about the nature of humanity. In 
any particular culture or society, what do people think constitutes 
a human being? And who is therefore qualified to claim human 
rights? In most cases, the answer is to be found in the belief system 
of people. These questions are fundamental for understanding the 
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relationship between religion and human rights. In many cultures, 
people attach overwhelming importance to the spiritual dimension 
of a person, believing that it is this which defines him or her as pos-
sessing a truly human identity.42 In other cases, human identity is 
not considered a fixed category, but something fluid. In some for-
est countries of West Africa, for example, it is widely believed that 
people closely resemble certain animals, including leopards and 
chimpanzees, and may even take on some of their characteristics.43 
Similar examples can be found all over the world. New Zealand, 
for example, recently became the first country to recognise in law 
the status of the great apes, as man’s closest relatives. This step was 
taken on the basis of scientific evidence that the great apes share 
not only our genes but also basic human traits such as self-aware-
ness and intelligence.44 
Societies, moreover, hold different views about the precise point 
at which true human life may be identified, and when it ceases. 
In some cultures, very young children may be lawfully killed on 
the grounds that they are not, or not yet, really human. A similar 
debate on the definition of humanity takes place in Western socie-
ties today, in relation to such questions as abortion, euthanasia, 
and gene technology. In many places, theologians or other religious 
specialists decide upon such matters. In Western society, questions 
such as these are now largely referred to experts in medical ethics. 
By replacing the theologians, they have become the secular moral-
ists of our time. 
Conclusion
Let me summarize my argument at this point. 
Present circumstances, I have argued, require a reconsideration of 
the relationship between religion and human rights. Religion, or 
religious belief, I suggest, while often seen as a root cause of violent 
conflict, is in fact a particular expression of human sentiments and 
ideas which are also present in secular cultures. In most cases the 
outbreak of violence cannot be ascribed to the nature of religious 
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belief as such since, like all human institutions, religion can be 
used for either constructive or destructive purposes. Its resources 
can be applied both for the protection of human rights and for 
their violation. The challenge is to try and exploit the positive 
resources which are present in virtually all religions. 
So far, little use has been made by human rights promotors of the 
world’s religious and spiritual resources.45 An intelligent use of reli-
gious resources requires and presupposes a serious consideration of 
religion as an important factor in people’s lives. In this one respect, 
we can agree with Huntington, when he concluded his sombre 
analysis with a call to develop a more profound understanding of 
the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying what 
he describes as ‘other civilizations’.46
I have further argued that globalization contains, almost inevitably, 
a tendency towards the globalization of moral ideas in connection 
with human rights, whether these ideas are based on a religious or 
secular ideology. Consequently, cultural relativism, which demands 
a position of exception, is becoming an increasingly untenable 
stance. At the same time, it must be clear that universalizing 
human rights is not the same as Westernizing human rights. For 
the inculturation of human rights must be a two-way process, in 
which Western proponents of human rights learn and accept that 
certain values derived from a culture which is originally not theirs 
may actually be of use to them too. These may include religious 
values. 
Finally, given the fact that human rights are claims that people are 
entitled to make simply because of being human, I have empha-
sized the importance for all of us, in and outside the Western 
world, of considering the fundamental question which underlies 
all human rights thought: what is a human being? This is neces-
sary if we are to deve lop a proper understanding of the process 
which begins with labelling people as different from us, and which 
can lead, through excesses of language, to the grossest violation 
of human rights. The same question draws us towards ideas about 
good and evil which are prominent in many religions in the world 
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and which to a greater or lesser extent guide people’s actions 
towards others and thus have a bearing on human rights. 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
The profound changes that the world is experiencing today impel 
us to examine religion anew, as one of the agents of social change. 
The Chair which is being inaugurated today may be seen as a recog-
nition of the importance of such an approach, notably in regard to 
human rights. 
In the years to come I hope to investigate further some of the ideas 
which I have sketched in the last hour, notably in view of the role 
of religion in situations of conflict. In implementing such a pro-
gramme, it is particularly important in my view to examine the 
views of ordinary believers in matters of human rights, and not 
limit ourselves to the views of religious and political elites. This 
implies focusing less on scriptural traditions than on ideas which 
are expressed in other forms. At the same time, any analysis of reli-
gion and human rights requires empirical study of the actual situa-
tions in which these ideas are expressed. For, as the British anthro-
pologist Richard Wilson has noted, human rights are founded not 
in the eternal moral categories of social philosophy, but are the 
result of concrete social struggles.47 
The debate on religion, human rights and social change is not an 
academic debate only. Its subject matter is of equal importance to 
all who are concerned about human rights in the world, or take 
an interest in understanding processes of change. I consider it my 
task to share academic insights with interested parties outside the 
academic world. As incumbent of the Chair I will therefore try and 
stimulate debate on relevant matters within a wider public circle. 
It is in this light that I would like to draw your attention to a forth-
coming series of Open Seminars about ‘Religious Fundamentalism 
and Social Change’, organised at the ISS under the auspices of the 
Chair, which will start at the end of this month and will continue 
in May. 
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The Chair on Religion, Human Rights and Social Change is an 
Extraordinary Chair in more than one sense. As far as I am aware 
it has no equivalent in the world. We can all be grateful  to the 
founders of the Chair – the organizations Cordaid, ICCO, and the 
World Conference for Religion and Peace – for having taken this 
unique initiative. It is a great privilege for me to be the first person 
to occupy this position. I would like to thank both the members 
of the Board and the Curatorium of the Foundation established in 
connection with the Chair for their active interest in the Chair and 
their support to its incumbent. I greatly appreciate that, and I hope 
you will find that this new Chair will also benefit the work of the 
founding organizations. 
I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Board of the 
Institute of Social Studies, which has welcomed this new Chair as 
part of its body. I strongly believe that the study of religion has an 
important contribution to make to the life of the Institute, not only 
in matters concerning human rights and social change, but also in 
fostering broader thought about development issues. I hope that 
any contribution I am able to make under the auspices of the Chair 
will help with the constant new thinking which is taking place in 
this field, both in this Institute and in the wider world.
I want to thank the ISS staff, both academic and administrative, for 
the way they have made me feel welcome in their midst. With your 
helpfulness you have made my arrival in this new environment a 
most pleasant one, and your forthcoming attitude has soon pro-
vided me with a sense of belonging. I feel among ‘people like us’. I 
owe a special thanks to my colleagues in Staff Group 2 who, each in 
their own way, have contributed to my immediate job satisfaction. 
It is my greatest wish to be able to collaborate with you in the years 
to come in a mutually beneficial way. You can rest assured that I 
will do all that I can to further that aim. 
To the ISS students I wish to say that I hope that you too will expe-
rience the new Chair and its activities as an asset to your work and 
your stay at the Institute. For me, your presence is a great challenge 
as it presents me with a unique opportunity to learn from your 
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knowledge and experience, acquired in the various countries from 
which you have come. 
As one should never forget where one comes from, I want to 
include in my thanks my colleagues and friends in the mundane 
business of the study of religion in various universities and depart-
ments. I thank you all for your continuing friendship and support. 
Since I am not planning to leave you, I am sure we will continue to 
cooperate. 
Finally, life would not be worth living if one were not sustained 
by personal networks of affection. I therefore thank all of you who 
know you are dear to me for being with me today, as I know you 
will continue to be in the future. 
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you all for your attention. 
Rats, Cockroaches and People Like Us: Views of Humanity and Human 
Rights. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 2000 (Inaugural 
Address).
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Chosen People: The Concept of 
Diaspora in the Modern World
Introduction
People from all over Africa have settled in all parts of Western 
Europe in substantial numbers over the past thirty years.1 In many 
cases, it is the political and economic situation in Africa which 
forces people to move outside their country to look for work and 
security. From the little we know it is clear that the circumstances 
of migration are a vital factor in shaping the religious life of those 
concerned.2
Many African migrants in Europe belong to one of the two major 
religious traditions, Islam or Christianity. In both cases we lack 
substantial information on the religious dimension of their life in 
Europe. We may feel reasonably well informed about Muslims in 
Europe more generally (for example Shadid and van Koningsveld 
eds, 1996), including those from North Africa, but we have little 
specific information on the religious life of Muslim communities in 
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Europe which originate in sub-Saharan Africa. One may think of the 
large Somali communities in various countries of Europe, includ-
ing the Netherlands; of the Malian and Senegalese communities in 
France, or East African Muslim communities in Greece. The same 
is true for African Christian communities in Europe, including the 
Ethiopian community representing the ancient Coptic tradition, 
or the Kimbanguist Church representing the independent church 
tradition in sub-Saharan Africa. The most striking developments are 
presently found in the large number of pentecostal and evangelical 
congregations which have recently been established mostly by West 
Africans. In the United Kingdom such developments have a longer 
history than in most of continental Europe. In Britain, Nigerians 
in particular have been founding new and independent churches 
since the mid-1960s (Killingray 1994, p. 19), while on the European 
continent the foundation of new congregations has been a devel-
opment of only the last few years which can be largely ascribed to 
Christian believers from Ghana (ter Haar 1995b).
The growth of African Christian communities on the European con-
tinent is one of the most striking developments in the recent reli-
gious life of Western Europe. Examples are Germany, Italy, Belgium 
and Holland, to mention some front-runners. This is certainly true 
of the Netherlands, where African-initiated churches now exist 
in many cities. The majority are in Amsterdam, where there are 
almost forty such churches, mostly in one particular district, the 
Bijlmermeer, which is known as a home of migrant communities 
(ter Haar 1996). Many of these new churches have been established 
in the empty spaces under the multi-storey car parks that are situat-
ed under the tower blocks in the district. While previously invisible 
and unheard of, the world came to know about them after a tragic 
accident one Sunday in October 1992 when a cargo plane crashed 
into some of these towerblocks.
Any analysis of these new religious developments should be seen 
in the light of the global process of migration, which defines the 
lives of many Africans in Europe. International migration provokes 
strong political response in most countries of Europe today. One of 
the most disturbing aspects of European immigration policy is its 
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tendency towards the exclusion of black people. This has already 
led to the European Union being described as 'fortress Europe' 
(Dunkwu 1993), a stronghold for whites to defend against the 'surg-
ing' crowd from Africa.3 The religious response of Africans to this 
situation is often ignored or minimised by Western observers, if not 
dismissed altogether. Alternatively, the role of religion in the life 
of African migrants is reduced to an exotic aspect of life that may 
seem colourful against the background of Western secular life. Or 
again, their religious expression is simply related to a 'traditional' 
background in Africa. None of these approaches take as its start-
ing-point the religious life of Africans in Europe, which to many 
migrants is a central feature of their existence.
It is against this background that I want to look at the concept 
of diaspora as it is often used today in either a popular sense or 
among academics with regard to religious minority groups. In 
doing so I will focus on the African diaspora communities, nota-
bly the Christian ones, taking the Netherlands as my example. 
Terminology is important. All writers, to some extent, use a vocabu-
lary which reflects their own cultural attributes and ideology, and 
it is important to be aware of this (ter Haar 1995c). It is interesting, 
for example, to see that the common notion of 'scattering' which is 
connected to the diaspora concept refers to members of a religious 
community who are living among a different faith community, 
such as in the case of Muslims or Hindus living in a European coun-
try shaped by Christian tradition and culture. The application of 
that same idea to Christians coming from Africa, as is happening 
today, has serious consequences for their situation in the West. It 
obscures the fact that African Christians living in Europe are not 
adherents of some strange unknown religion, but are Christians. 
The general connotation is for people described as being 'in diaspo-
ra' to be basically unhappy and pitiful, because they find them-
selves in a place where they neither belong nor desire to be. As a 
minority group, they are commonly believed to link up with their 
'own' people at home, that is in their original homelands, and thus 
retain what is believed to be their 'own' identity, than to link up 
with the majority in their new homelands. This appears to be also 
the case even if in the migrants' own opinion they share at least a 
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common faith, as African Christians do. For ideological and socio-
logical reasons, therefore, it is important to look into the meanings 
of the diaspora concept as we use it to refer to religious minority 
groups (see also Baumann 1995).
The Concept of Diaspora
The concept of diaspora has been marked by the indelible experi-
ence of exile as part of Jewish history. It originally referred to Jews 
living outside Judea, as they had been doing since the sixth century 
BCE after the city of Jerusalem had been conquered by the armies 
of the Babylonian empire.4 The word 'diaspora' was subsequently 
coined by the makers of the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, 
the so-called Septuagint, to designate a specific group of people 
who find themselves in a state of being scattered. It appears, how-
ever, that some connotations which have become attached to the 
word 'diaspora' are modern. Tromp (1995, pp. 2-3) has pointed out 
that it is often taken for granted that the Jews who lived outside 
Judea experienced their migrant status as undesirable, and that 
Jerusalem became the symbol of their happiness and their longing 
to live in the land of their God. These Jews, he argues, are generally 
understood to have felt homeless and uprooted in antiquity. Their 
environment, believed to be fundamentally hostile to the Jewish 
way of life, would on the one hand have allured them because of 
the social and economic advantages assimilation seemed to offer, 
but on the other hand repelled them because of the threat to their 
proper, traditional identity represented by cultural assimilation.
According to Tromp, this is a very misleading picture, which is also 
incompatible with the self-perception of the Jews living outside 
Judea. He shows how in the Old Testament the word 'diaspora' is 
used in such a way as to bring out the omnipotence, righteousness 
and mercy of God, as the one who graciously gathers the dispersed. 
All emphasis is on the acts of God, and the term, therefore, tells 
us very little about the dispersed themselves and how they experi-
enced their situation (ibid, p. 11). The term 'diaspora' is primarily 
used to praise God who has the power to gather the scattered, 
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and not to describe the pitiful situation of people living abroad. 
Moreover, the ancient Jews in the diaspora were not at all in a 
deplorable situation, as Tromp shows on the basis of some histori-
cal examples. The life of Jewish minorities in some of the main 
urban centres in the Hellenistic and Roman empires demonstrates 
not only how Jews living outside Judea were firmly settled in the 
lands and cities where' they lived, but also how, in spite of being 
Jews, they were socially and legally accepted by the non-Jewish 
inhabitants. Tromp's conclusion is that these Jews had no particu-
lar longing for Jerusalem, which was to them a foreign city, in the 
same way as Judea was to them a foreign country, but that they 
regarded the very places where they were living as their home.
This, of course, has some consequence for the question of identity. 
What constituted a Jewish identity in these circumstances? One 
important aspect is that Jews in the so-called diaspora were not 
easily recognisable as such. An outsider could not distinguish a 
Jew from a non-Jew unless the Jew made himself known as such. 
As Tromp points out, they were not racially distinct, they did not 
wear special clothes, they often had quite ordinary names and 
they all spoke ordinary Greek (ibid, p. 18). In other words, Jews liv-
ing outside Judea could only be designated as Jews on the basis of 
their self-definition. A problem enters where others - in this case, 
non-Jews - come to define Jewish identity, such as was the case in 
ancient Alexandria. When the Romans conquered the city in 30 
BCE the position of the Jewish minority changed drastically. The 
Roman administration introduced a poll-tax, from which the Greek 
citizens of Alexandria were exempt. This, in turn, required the 
inhabitants of the city to prove their Greek descent, which set in 
motion a process of ethnic labelling with political implications. The 
Jews, who before had had no reason to hide their Jewishness, felt 
suddenly degraded to second-class citizens. They therefore resisted 
the new measure and demanded ~ as Jews - to be acknowledged as 
legitimate citizens of the city, equal to the original Greeks. From 
then there is a development in Jewish writings which insists on 
keeping the Jewish law, in contrast to a number of non-Jewish writ-
ings attacking the Jewish way of life. In short, as Tromp concludes, 
the new Roman polity created an ethnic strife which caused Jews 
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to stress their otherness, now that they had been confronted with 
their distinction from the non-Jews which had formerly been taken 
for granted (ibid, p. 19). Due to new policy, it was no longer possible 
to be Greek and Jew at the same time. As a result, the Jews began 
to defend an exclusive collective Jewish identity which had, in fact, 
been forced upon them; a process which initiated an increasing 
estrangement between Jews and non-Jews and led to violence (ibid, 
p. 20).
The African Diaspora
The Jewish example is very instructive because of its bearing on the 
situation of Africans today living outside the African continent. The 
use of the term 'diaspora' in reference to peoples of African origin 
clearly draws on the Jewish experience, tailoring it specifically to 
the situation of Africans scattered outside the African continent. 
Its use in this context is rather new. Although its origins may be 
traced to the nineteenth century,5 it came into fashion around the 
1960s, notably among African-American scholars or referring to the 
African American population, and is also referred to at times as the 
'black' diaspora. Historical research in the United States has shown 
that there is a relationship between the use and development 
of the term 'African diaspora', the dismantling of the European 
colonial empires and the emergence of independent nations in 
Africa. Before that era, the idea may be traced to the works of some 
nineteenth-century historians and other writers who applied the 
Biblical concept of the diaspora. It is often argued that the concept 
of the African diaspora can be traced to the Bible, notably to the 
text of Psalms 68:31 which speaks of Ethiopia stretching out her 
hands unto God which - we may note in passing - is also the text 
underlying the emergence of the first independent churches in 
Africa at the turn of the twentieth century, in South Africa, known 
as 'Ethiopian churches' (Sundkler 1961). Another relevant Biblical 
reference in this context is the story in the Acts of the Apostles 
(Ch. 8: 26-39) which relates the encounter between the Ethiopian 
eunuch and Queen Candace.
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In the 1950s and 1960s the African diaspora emerged as an explicit 
concept in the English-speaking world; it found a counterpart in 
the French-speaking world around the same time in the develop-
ment of the concept of negritude, advanced by the former President 
of Senegal, Leopold Sédar Senghor. From the 1960s onwards the 
term 'African diaspora' has become a well-known concept, although 
often used in an unscholarly manner. George Shepperson, for exam-
ple, a British expert on the African diaspora, points to the fact that 
the historical distinction between diaspora and exile in the Jewish 
tradition is often overlooked. 'Exile' always implies forced or invol-
untary dispersion, whereas 'diaspora' includes some element of 
voluntary migration. To overlook that difference, in his view, would 
connect the study of the 'African diaspora' exclusively to the study 
of enforced dispersal, that is to slavery (Shepperson 1993). But the 
term 'African diaspora', as it is often used today, is problematic for 
a number of reasons, mostly because the concept has been shaped 
by the American context and since it is not clear what precisely 
we mean by it in the context of Europe. In the United States, the 
term is commonly used to refer to all citizens of African descent, 
that is black Americans, many of whom today consciously refer to 
themselves as African-Americans. They share a collective memory 
of the transatlantic slave trade which forcibly expelled millions of 
Africans from the continent of their birth.6 The intrinsic connection 
of the African diaspora with the history of the slave trade consti-
tutes the essential characteristic of the diaspora concept in both 
North and South America. African diaspora studies are a standard 
feature of the academic syllabus in North America and are gener-
ally considered in the light of this specific history. In 1979, Howard 
University in Washington established the First African Diaspora 
Studies Institute (FADSI), bringing together for the first time schol-
ars from Africa, the Americas, and Europe to discuss various aspects 
of researching and teaching African diaspora studies (Harris 1982, 
p. 4).
Discussion of the applicability of the term diaspora, therefore, has 
been taking place in the United States for some considerable time. 
Although there seems to be a broad consensus regarding the use of 
the term, there is also a clear awareness that this may encourage 
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irrelevant comparisons with the Jewish diaspora of the modern era. 
Therefore, the suggestion to use the term in a purely descriptive 
manner to describe 'the historical phenomenon of the dispersion 
and settlement of Africans abroad' (Harris 1982, pp. 4-5) not only 
suits the scholar of religion but also does justice to the original 
event that gave rise to the phenomenon, that is the slave trade. 
What is required, however, is to analyse the phenomenon and try 
to explain its meaning. Within the broadly defined framework 
of the dispersion and settlement of Africans abroad it remains 
important to consider the specific features of the African diaspora 
in America and distinguish them from the situation pertaining to 
Europe. If we follow the definition provided by FADSI, the African 
diaspora embodies:
the voluntary and forced dispersion of Africans at dif-
ferent periods in history and in several directions; the 
emergence of a cultural identity abroad without los-
ing the African base, whether spiritually or physically; 
the psychological or physical return to the homeland, 
Africa'. (Harris 1982, p. 5)
We see that the term 'African diaspora' here contains three key ele-
ments: dispersion, identity, and return. It may be useful to see how far 
these elements are relevant to the specific conditions of Africans 
in Europe. I propose to examine this more closely by taking the 
Netherlands as my example.7
Dispersion
The dispersion of Africans on a more or less large scale has taken 
place since medieval times when large numbers of Africans were 
captured and taken .to the Middle East and Asia for forced labour 
by intruding people. The dispersion to the Americas started after 
the voyages of Columbus, as a result of the ensuing spread of 
knowledge about the Americas to a European public. This led to a 
form of globalisation - an encounter of two worlds - of which the 
African diaspora was an important by-product (Conniff and Davis 
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1994, p. 306). It became a central aspect during the slave trade of 
later centuries when the 'African diaspora' proved vital in the shap-
ing of the Americas. Since then the African diaspora has expanded 
in all directions and recently also made its impact on the European 
continent. The migration of Africans to Europe is generally a mod-
ern phenomenon which - although not totally unrelated - does 
not arise directly from the history of the slave trade, but is born 
of circumstances inherent in the conditions of a globalised world. 
Labour  migration is one important aspect of that, as a result of 
which Africans can be found everywhere in the industrialised 
world.
Today, we find Africans scattered over most countries of the 
European Union, while in some countries, notably the United- 
Kingdom and France, one may speak of a tradition of African or, in 
a wider sense, black presence (Killingray 1994). The question wheth-
er their dispersion has been forced or voluntary goes beyond the 
descriptive level and depends to a large extent on the individual's 
subjective view in defining the matter. In present circumstances 
subjective views risk being influenced by the public debate on 
migration which has taken a new turn since the emergence of the 
European Union as a political entity. As a result, European govern-
ments have introduced refined categories designed to distinguish 
one type of migrant from another and to separate what they consid-
er legitimate immigrants from those they see as illegitimate ones. 
An inflated vocabulary is one of the clearest expressions of this. In 
the Netherlands, a whole new vocabulary has been invented to dis-
tinguish between various types of refugees with a view to reducing 
the number of legal immigrants.
Definitions are rarely static, but it is nevertheless striking how 
rapidly the content of terms related to the process of migration is 
changing and adapted to the political needs of the day. What these 
labels have in common is the fact that they all refer to people who 
for one reason or another have felt obliged to leave their country 
and settle elsewhere. That is, they are all migrants, people on the 
move, in many cases individual travellers who have effectively 
removed the distinction between forced or voluntary dispersion 
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which proved so significant in the American context. The reasons 
for the presence of Africans in Europe today are largely dictated by 
the state of affairs in the home countries. With the exception of 
Britain and France, the major former colonial powers in Africa, the 
great majority of Africans in Europe today have migrated because 
of some form of upheaval in their own country, of a nature which 
often makes it difficult to separate economic from political causes.
The circumstances of dispersion in Europe, therefore, are quite 
different from the conditions in America. The history of forced 
dispersion through the slave trade has marked the common psyche 
of African-Americans in a way which is not unlike the holocaust 
experience of Jewish history. The slave owners tried to erase all 
aspects of African culture, including religion, and to undermine 
every aspect of African identity. The slave experience which has 
been so vital to the development of a specific African identity in the 
Americas is virtually absent among African communities in Europe 
(although in the case of the Netherlands it is an irony that it is 
mostly Ghanaians who have settled there, thus by their very pres-
ence confronting the Netherlands with its own disreputable role in 
the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century slave trade in the former 
Gold Coast: Postma 1990). An exception has to be made, to some 
extent, for Britain, where the awareness of the slave past continues 
to live among African-American descendents.
Identity
The element of identity invariably proves the most important one 
in the diaspora context, whether for internal or external reasons. 
In anthropological terms, identity is a social concept about groups 
of people who think of themselves, or are thought of by others, as 
alike in some significant way (Moore 1994, p. 130). More generally, 
identity is taken as indicating a distinguishing character of a per-
son or a group of persons, in this case suggesting a specific set of 
characteristics which may be ascribed to Africans in the diaspora 
and which can be seen as differentiating them from the society in 
which they live. Here, the emphasis is on cultural identity in which 
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religion has an obvious part, and it is on the religious aspect that I 
will concentrate.
In the American context the development of an African identity has 
become highly important for descendants of the African diaspora 
due to the concerted efforts mentioned before to disrupt the 
African person. Since culture is an important aspect of identity, 
cultural issues figure high on the agenda of the African diaspora 
in America. This is also demonstrated by the new forms of religion 
which have emerged in the Americas as the result of a conscious 
interaction between belief systems of the past and present. One 
may think of' religions such as umbanda and candomblé, which 
are very popular in Brazil, the voodoo religion of Haiti, or the winti 
religion of Surinam which also exists today in the Netherlands. 
Further examples include the many adherents of Yoruba religion 
in the United States, as well as many other cults which have their 
roots in the religious traditions of West Africa particularly. The link 
with the slave past is central to the emergence and development 
of the great variety of African-American religions and to the con-
tent of religious beliefs and practices of many African-Americans. 
An interesting example in this respect is the umbanda religion in 
Brazil, whose deities reflect the different cultural influences in the 
history of the country.
In contrast to the Americas, the presence of significant numbers 
of Africans in Europe is a relative novelty. It is because of these 
growing numbers that in the last decade so many African congre-
gations have been formed in continental Europe, a trend which 
we saw has been noticeable in Britain for much longer. Due to 
the specific background of this latest diaspora trend, and unlike 
the situation in the Americas at the time of the slave trade, most" 
Africans in Europe did not bring their African traditional religions 
with them (which is not to deny the existence of cultural links with 
African traditions), but rather, as a belief system, they brought with 
them their 'new' religions, Islam or Christianity. We are rather ill-
informed about African Islam in Europe but it seems that African 
Muslims have not formed their own congregations in the same way 
as African Christian congregations have done. In France and Italy, 
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for example, Muslims from Senegal have formed networks through 
the Mouride brotherhood, but these, in spite of their religious func-
tions, seem more comparable to, for example, Ghanaians' cultural 
associations (Schmidt di Friedberg 1996). In the Netherlands, on the 
other hand, African Muslims tend to pray at one of the mosques 
which are frequented by Muslims from Turkey and Morocco or 
from Surinam, or practise their religion in private.
In the case of the African-initiated churches in Europe, it is not the 
history of the slave trade which exerts a pervasive influence on the 
lives of their members but rather the history of the colonial past. 
The history of Christian mission and church formation in Africa 
is inextricably bound up with the history of colonial domination 
and, among other factors, is the root cause of the emergence of 
independent churches in Africa.8 From the very beginning African 
churches have struggled to escape from Western domination, par-
ticularly in the form of the so-called African independent churches, 
but increasingly also within the framework of the so-called main-
line churches. The latter's concern with 'inculturation' - that is, 
finding ways of making the gospel relevant to a specific cultural 
context and thus allowing for the expression of an 'African identity' 
in religion - is a significant sign in this respect.9
The question thus emerges of how relevant the issue of African 
identity is to African Christians in Europe. With specific reference 
to the situation in the Netherlands, I have argued before that the 
discussion regarding the need for African Christians in Europe 
to develop their own identity as African Christians is being led 
by their European counterparts and serves European rather than 
African interests in at least some cases (ter Haar 1995a). African 
Christians in the Netherlands, for example, identify themselves first 
as Christians and only secondly as Africans or African Christians. 
That is, in their own view, their public adherence to Christianity 
constitutes the most important element of their identity. Yet, 
there is a general tendency in the Netherlands to separate African 
Christians from their Dutch counterparts by insisting on their 
perceived African identity, while ignoring their shared Christian 
identity. It is a pattern which fits in well with the Dutch social sys-
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tem of developing specific group identities and which, in the past, 
provided some of the intellectual basis for the system of apartheid. 
It would be interesting to compare the Dutch attitude with the situ-
ation in other parts of Europe, where different social mechanisms 
exist for the integration of foreigners. 
Britain provides an interesting example in this regard. Gerd 
Baumann (1996), who has done research among South Asian 
migrants in Southall in London, has remarked on the interest of 
the state in negotiating identity. He demonstrates, with particu-
lar reference to the case of the Sikhs, how the British state uses a 
religious definition of identity for purely secular, administrative 
purposes. Although the people thus categorised may not have been 
consulted in regard to their own collective labelling, they can turn 
their new official identity to advantage by using it as a basis to 
negotiate their own interests with the state. One obvious example 
is the allocation of money for community welfare. When this hap-
pens, an originally religious identity becomes a political one as 
well, and the political component may in due time surpass the reli-
gious aspect in importance. This 'ethnicization' of religious diver-
sity, Baumann shows, has the opposite effect of what is intended, 
namely integration and incorporation into the existing political sys-
tem. The end result is likely to be the marginalisation of religious 
minority groups as specific ethnic communities within the bounda-
ries of the secular state (G. Baumann 1995).
With similar effect intellectuals of all sorts tend to ascribe an eth-
nic identity to African Christians in Europe (M. Baumann 1995, p. 
1). Academic specialists tend to emphasise migrants' African roots, 
thus contributing to segregation of Africans and non-Africans in 
this part of the world. In a different way, this is also furthered by 
the public insistence on Africans' right to develop their own mean-
ing 'African' - identity. This is not to say that Africans do not have 
such a right, but that the necessity to promote this should not 
be imposed by others. One result is, in the Dutch case, that while 
African Christians are trying to enter the mainstream of Western 
Christian culture by identifying themselves primarily as Christians, 
non-Africans ensure that they stay 'beyond the pale' by imposing 
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on them a requirement to develop what they perceive to be cen-
tral to their identity, namely their 'Africanness', as this is believed 
to express itself traditionally. One may wonder how much this is 
also symptomatic of a fundamental racial prejudice in the form 
of a belief on the part of some Europeans in the incompatability 
of being genuinely Christian and genuinely African at the same 
time.10 A symptom of the same line of thought can be found in the 
common reference to African-initiated congregations in Europe 
as 'African churches', implying some form of Christianity which is 
only suitable for African Christians. A logical next step would be to 
suggest that African Christianity is a different religion altogether.
African Christians in the Netherlands are well aware that the 
emphasis on their perceived otherness will work against them 
in that it will contribute to their isolation in society rather than 
allowing them to link up with mainstream - that is Western - 
Christianity. For the same reason they are opposed to the label 
'African churches' which is generally bestowed on them (for exam-
ple Himmans-Arday 1996, p. 2). Instead, they refer to themselves as 
'international churches', thereby expressing their wish to be open 
to all Christian believers, irrespective of race and colour. The insist-
ence of many non-Africans on the existence of a specific 'African 
identity', whether this is inspired by religious orthodoxy or by intel-
lectual liberalism, IS in effect a continuation of the old colonial 
and early missionary discourse and praxis regarding the perceived 
'otherness' of Africans (Hinga 1994). It also reminds one of the 
experiences of the Jews in Alexandria who - due to outside pressure 
- were forced to develop a specific identity of their own which up 
to then they had not felt a need to do as they were content simply 
to be Jews among non-Jews. Similarly, I would like to argue that 
Africans in the Netherlands are happy to be Africans among non-
Africans, that is the Dutch without turning their African-ness into 
a major issue. For African migrants in Europe, their African iden-
tity is in principle as much a matter of course as a Jewish identity 
was for the Jews in the Hellenistic cities (Tromp 1995, p.20 in both 
cases this originally had nothing to do with a deliberate choice. I 
would want to draw the parallel even further. Just as the ancient 
Jews felt no reason to assert their identity outside Judea as long as 
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they were socially and politically accepted, but also had no reason 
to renounce their identity, since non-Jews accepted their way of 
life, in the same way African believers in Europe would have no 
reason to either emphasise or hide their identity if they were sim-
ply accepted as fellow-citizens of Europe, who to some extent have 
their own way of life.
Not only should the definition of one's identity result from a proc-
ess of negotiation in which at least the people concerned partici-
pate, but also I believe that the development of a collective identity 
can take place only if one’s personal identity, that is, the integrity 
of the individual, has been secured. Obviously, the mechanisms for 
that are influenced by size of a particular minority group vis-à-vis 
the majority population, which marks another difference between 
the American and European diaspora situation. Africans in Europe 
are in a minority position, with little or no power as a group. For 
many of them, their religion helps them to achieve a type of securi-
ty and inner strength which may well encourage them in future to 
reconsider their self-identity specifically in terms of being African 
Christians or Muslims. Alternatively, the experience of exclusion, 
inspired by racism or other excluding mechanisms, may have a sim-
ilar effect. This is the case for example, in Britain where, due to the 
circumstances of an entirely different context, African and Afro'-
Caribbean church leaders tend to insist on their African identity in 
the experience of faith.11
Return
The element of return is the last key element in defining the con-
cept of the African diaspora. The question here is to determine 
whether a longing to return to the 'homeland' pertains to the situ-
ation of Africans in Europe. In this case, too, I would argue that 
we are dealing with a fundamentally different situation, result-
ing from the different historical context in which the diasporas 
has been constituted. The post-war history of migration in Europe 
has taught us not only that physical return on a permanent basis 
frequently does not take place, not even among first-generation 
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migrants, but that in the second and third generation also the psy-
chological importance of return largely disappears. The belief that 
Africans will return to their homelands as soon as they can pos-
sibly do so is contradicted by the realities of today. Of course, cases 
of individual returns are known, for example in situations where 
stability returns to the home country’ and a new future seems pos-
sible. In most cases, however, and in spite of the difficulties facing 
them, the future for Africans in Europe looks less dim than if they 
were to return to their home countries, particularly if they have 
succeeded in finding employment, and since many of  them have 
started to raise families and are able to provide their children with 
better prospects.  Although the link with the homeland is not likely 
to disappear, this has little to do with the longing for the country 
of the past as might be seen in America, where all existing links 
with homeland Africa were cut off by the slave trade.
If we examine the African congregations in Europe, to judge from 
my research in the Netherlands the element of return in the earlier 
defined sense is absent. Members of congregations are using their 
religious imagination to designate a legitimate space for them-
selves in the West by comparing their own experiences to those of 
the Israelites. They refer to Biblical examples which show that God 
does not respect borders and that his children today are as free as 
the children of Israel. Biblical models instil in them the faith that, 
with the help of God, borders will only prove temporary obstacles. 
In a different way, stories such as that of Ruth and Naomi, who left 
the land of Moab to find work and shelter in Bethlehem, inspire 
further faith among the believers. Throughout history, the imagery 
of the Bible has been a major inspiration for Africans in the diaspo-
ra, not least because of its perceived references to Africa.12 The 
importance of the Bible in the lives of African Christian congrega-
tions, in Europe as in Africa itself, cannot easily be overestimated. 
While outside observers often tend to consider their attachment 
to the literal text of the Bible simply as a sign of 'fundamentalism' 
- another highly ideologised concept which seems to have almost 
completely lost its descriptive meaning – for African Christians 
themselves this constitutes a constant source of inspiration which 
helps them succeed in their struggle for life. Conversely, however, 
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the idea of return to the homeland which is implicit in the diaspo-
ra concept is helpful in strengthening the belief among Europeans 
that one day these people will ‘go home’ – a politically convenient 
thought.
African Christians in Europe, as far as I can see, do not look back 
to the African past while spiritually and physically preparing for 
their return. On the contrary they strike me as forward-looking 
people who use all their material and spiritual resources to secure 
for themselves a better future in Europe. They have lived in Africa, 
many in parts of the continent other than their place of origin due 
to the situation in their home country. It is relevant to recall, in 
this context, that Africa is the continent which not only contains 
more refugees than any other continent, but also has a long tra-
dition of migrant labour within the continent. 13 Since Western 
Europe is one of the most stable parts of the world politically 
and economically, Africans, like migrants from other parts of the 
world, will continue to come looking for work, and their religious 
belief helps them greatly in their endeavour. In other words, at the 
present time, their promised land is not Africa, but Europe, and - 
similar to my suggestions on the concept of identity as a key factor 
in the diaspora complex the belief in a return of African migrants 
to Africa appears to exist chiefly on the part of non-Africans.
Conclusion
If, then, as I have argued, at least two of the three major ele-
ments of what constitutes the 'African diaspora' in the light of the 
American experience (namely identity and return) are of doubtful 
application, can we still apply the term 'diaspora' in the context of 
Europe? In discussing the ancient Jewish diaspora, Tromp comes 
to the final conclusion that we had better abandon the term alto-
gether as inappropriate, both on moral and empirical grounds. As 
he demonstrates, the popular connotations of the diaspora concept 
are not conducive to human dignity, while there is no empirical 
indication that these 'diaspora' Jews were intrinsically unhappy. 
The same applies to African Christians in Europe for whom the 
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exclusive orientation towards Africa which is implied in the con-
cept of 'African diaspora' would make their life in Europe by defini-
tion imperfect, in the same way as this was believed to be true for 
Jews living outside Judea because they should be, or at least long to 
be, in Judea (Tromp 1995, p. 21). Ancient Jews and modern Africans, 
in both cases, ought to have a feeling of alienation and to look at 
themselves as strangers in their actual place of living.
Yet, in spite of the problems involved, I think we can use the 
concept of diaspora in our work, quite apart from the fact that it 
would virtually be impossible to get rid of the term now that we 
have lived with it for so long. We can use it in an academically 
acceptable and responsible way as long as we are aware of the 
metaphorical meaning of the term, and if we are prepared to use it 
in a descriptive manner as a dynamic concept subject to historical 
change. We will then be able to approach the subject in a scholarly 
and broadly comparative manner in a way suggested by Shepperson 
(1993, p. 47). First of all we can identify and investigate the specific 
areas to which dispersed Africans have gone and in which their 
descendants are living. In the present case, this means taking the 
European context - and not the African one - as our starting point. 
Secondly, we can study the interaction between the centres and the 
peripheries of the African diaspora in Europe at all possible levels, 
introducing the link with the home country only as a secondary 
consideration. Finally, we can stop the 'ghettoizing' of African his-
tory (Curtin 1995), and attempt to integrate these studies into the 
overall history of humanity, which is at the same time a plea for 
taking African history, including African religious history seriously.
These three successive steps can also be taken in studying specifi-
cally the religious aspects of the African diaspora in Europe, in 
conformity with the two pillars of the empirical study of religion: 
objective description and analysis. If this were to happen, a schol-
arly contribution would be made which – in the process – would rid 
the concept of diaspora of certain connotations and make it suit-
able for application in the broader comparative study of religion 
(M. Baumann 1995). The importance of the religious dimension in 
the study of so-called diaspora communities is easily overlooked by 
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scholars from a more secular background in favour of ethnicity and 
ethnic adherence, which can easily lead to the political construc-
tion of ethnic religions.
In the case of African religious communities in Europe the ten-
dency towards the ‘ethnicisation’ of religion poses a number of 
other questions to do with race relations which cannot be discussed 
here. But the observation that the preservation and perpetuation 
of religious identity can become a core issue in the diaspora can be 
fully shared for African Christians in Europe, whose independent 
churches single them out as 'chosen people'. In their own view, they 
have been chosen by God for a new purpose in Europe. Ironically, 
Europe does indeed regard them as 'different'.
‘Chosen people: the concept of diaspora in the modern world’, 
in S.J. Sutcliffe (ed.), Religion: Empirical Studies. A Collection to mark 
the 50th anniversary of the British Association for the Study of Religions, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 91-106.
Notes
1  Throughout this chapter 'Africa' is read as 'sub-Saharan Africa', i.e. excluding 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. According to the last available 
statistics, in 1993 the total number of African migrants is registered in the 
then fifteen member states of the European Union was 831,547 (Eurostat, 
Migration Statistics 1995). This does not include an unknown number of 
undocumented migrants.
2  For the UK this becomes clear from the works, amongst others, of Gerloff 
(1992) and Kalilombe (1995); examples from the Netherlands are Amoako-
Adusei (1991) and ter Haar (l995a).
3  Muus (1995, p. 121 .125) has drawn attention to the problematic way in 
which migration processes are often described, invoking a specific image 
drawn from metaphors of water rather than giving an accurate description 
of migration.
4  The following argument is taken from Tromp (1995).
5  Some historical precedents are Edward Blyden, William Du Bois, and Marcus 
Garvey.
6  According to Postma's (1990) authoritative account, a total of some ten mil-
lion Africans were carried as slaves of the 'new world'.
7  I am aware of the differences in situation in the various countries of Europe 
as defined by the differences in history and culture and therefore limit 
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myself in this case to the Netherlands. For more specific information on the 
African diaspora situation in the Netherlands, see ter Haar (1994).
8  There is a large academic literature on the history of African independent 
churches, particularly with regard to southern Africa. Among the most pro-
lific writers in this field are G.C. Oosthuizen and M.L. Daneel.
9  The subject of inculturation has been very popular, particularly in Roman 
Catholic circles:  for example, the discussions on the issue at the African 
Synod in Rome in April 1994.
10  This is a point which has often been made by the former Archbishop of 
Lusaka, Mgr. Emmanuel Milingo, who was removed from office after a dis-
pute concerning his healing ministry: see ter Haar (1992).
11  See for example Building bridges between African independent churches 
and the historic mission churches, a report of the proceedings of a consul-
tation organised by the Centre for Black and White Christian Partnership 
(Birmingham, UK) and the Organisation of African Instituted Churches 
(Nairobi, Kenya) at Nairobi in November 1995.
12  Cf. Shepperson (1993, pp. 46--47) who stresses the importance of scholarly 
work on the Bible and Africa for the study of the African diaspora.
13  Although we lack reliable statistics on migration trends in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is estimated that some 35 million Africans, or 8 per cent of the 
total population, live outside their own country (Muus 1995, p. 36).
Bibliography
Amoako-Adusei, J. 1991. 'Working in the boulevard of broken dreams': the activities of the 
R.C. chaplaincy for Africans. A short report. Amsterdam: Brakkenstein.
Baumann, G. 1995. 'Religious migrants in secular Britain? The secular state as agent 
of religious encorporation', Etnofoor, 7 (2) pp. 31-46.
Baumann, G. 1996. Contesting culture: discourses of identity in multi-ethnic London, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baumann, M. 1995. 'Conceptualizing diaspora: the preservation of religious identity 
in foreign parts, exemplified by Hindu communities outside India', Temenos 
31 pp. 19-35.
Conniff, M.L. and Davis, T.J. (eds) 1994. Africans in the Americas: a History of the Black 
Diaspora, New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Curtin, P.D. 1995. 'Ghettoizing African history', ASA News, Oct./Dec. 1995, pp. 6-7. 
Dunkwu, P. 1993. 'Communities of resistance in fortress Europe', in L. Back and A. 
Nayak (eds), Invisible Europeans?: Black People in the 'new Europe', Birmingham: 
AFFOR, pp. 129-136.
Gerloff, R.I.H. 1992. A plea for British Black Theologies: the black church movement in Britain 
in its transatlantic cultural and theological interaction with special reference to the 
Pentecostal Oneness (Apostolic) and Sabbatarian movements, Frankfurt AM.: Peter 
Lang.
ter Haar, G. 1992. Spirit of Africa: the Healing Ministry of Archbishop Milingo of Zambia, 
London:  Hurst & Co. 
45
ter Haar, G. 1994. 'Afrikaanse kerken in Nederland', in Religieuze Bewegingen in 
Nederland, 28 pp. 1-35. 
ter Haar, G. 1995a. 'Ritual as communication: a study of African Christian commu-
nities in the Bijlmer district of Amsterdam', in J.G. Platvoet and K. van del' 
Toorn (eds), Pluralism and identity: studies in ritual behaviour, Leiden: Brill, pp'. 
115-142.
ter Haar, G. 1995b. 'Strangers in the promised land: African Christians in Europe', 
Exchange 24 (I), pp. 1-33.
ter Haar, G. 1995c. 'African independent churches: the ideological implications of 
continuity and change', in A. Houtepen (ed.), The living tradition: towards an 
ecumenical hermeneutics of the Christian tradition, Zoetermeer: Meinema, pp. 159-
170.
ter Haar, G. 1996. 'Engelstalige Afrikaanse christenen in de regio Amsterdam', in 
J.A.B. Jongeneel, R. Budiman and J.J. Visser (eds), Gemeenschapsvorming van 
Aziatische, Afrikaanse en Midden-en Zuid-Amerikaanse christenen in Nederland: een 
geschiedenis in wording, Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, pp. 174-213.
Harris, J.E. (ed.) 1982. Global dimensions of the African Diaspora, Washington: Howard 
University Press (reprinted 1993). 
Himmans-Arday, D. 1996. And the truth shall set you free, London: Janus Publishing 
Company.
Hinga, T. 1994. 'Inculturation and the otherness of Africans: some reflections', in P. 
Turkson and F. Wijsen (eds), Inculturation: abide by the otherness of Africa and the 
Africans, Kampen; Kok, pp. 10-18.
Kalilombe, P.A. 1995. 'Black Christianity and its missionary outreach', paper pre-
sented at the Ethnic and Racial Studies Conference on 'Ethnic Minorities and 
Religions', London School of Economics and Political Science.
Killingray, D. (ed.) 1994. Africans in Britain, London: Frank Casso 
Moore, S. Falk 1994. Anthropology and Africa: changing perspectives on a changing scene, 
Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia.
Muus, P. 1995. De wereld in beweging: internationale migratie, mensen rechten en 
ontwikkeling, Utrecht: Jan van Arkel.
Postma, J.M. 1990. The Dutch in the Atlantic slave trade 1600-1815, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Schmidt di Friedberg, O. 1996, 'West African Islam in Italy: the Senegalese Mouride 
brotherhood as an economic and cultural network', in W.A.R. Shadid and 
P.S. van Koningsveld (eds), Political participation and identities of Muslims in non-
Muslim states, Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996, pp. 71-82.
Shadid, W.A.R. and van Koningsveld, P.S. (eds) 1996. Muslims in the margin: political 
responses to the presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos.
Shepperson, G. 1993[1982]. 'African diaspora: concept and context', in J.E. Harris (ed.), 
Global dimensions of the African diaspora, Washington: Howard University Press, 
pp. 41-49. 
Sundkler, B.G.M 1961[1948]. Bantu prophets in South Africa, London: Oxford University 
Press.
Tromp, J. 1995'. 'The ancient Jewish diaspora: some linguistic and sociological obser-
vations', paper presented at the conference on 'Religious communities in the 
diaspora', held at the University of Leiden, 8 December, 1995.
46
Winner of the EJDR Prize 2006
The Role of Religion in Development: 
Towards a New Relationship between 
the European Union and Africa
GERRIE TER HAAR and STEPHEN ELLIS1
The resilience of religion in developing countries is now plain to 
see. In Africa, religion shows no sign of disappearing or diminish-
ing in public importance, as development theorists have generally 
supposed. The European Union has normally excluded consid-
eration of the religious dimension in formulating development 
policies towards Africa. This article explores the possible role of 
religion in Africa’s development. It looks at a number of specific 
fields that are widely debated in the literature on development to 
consider ways in which religious ideas may be relevant to develop-
ment thinking. It concludes with some general considerations on 
how policymakers might be able to encompass religion as a factor 
in their strategic outlook. L’impact de la religion dans les pays en 
développement est maintenant évident. En Afrique, la religion ne 
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montre aucun signe de disparition ou de déclin, comme les théor-
iciens du développement l’ont généralement présumé. L’Union 
européenne a, en principe, exclu la prise en compte de la dimen-
sion religieuse dans la formulation de politique de développement 
envers l’Afrique. Cet article étudie le rôle potentiel de la religion 
dans le développement de l’Afrique. Il s’intéresse à un certain 
nombre de thèmes largement débattus dans la littérature sur le 
développement afin de considérer les voies au travers desquelles les 
idées religieuses pourraient être pertinentes pour la pensée sur le 
développement. Il conclut avec des considérations générales sur la 
façon dont les hommes politiques pourraient prendre en compte la 
religion dans la conception de leurs stratégies. 
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest surprises of recent decades has been the resil-
ience of religion. Many classic works of social science considered 
the ‘disenchantment’ of the world – to use Weber’s phrase – as an 
inevitable accompaniment of the rise of modern states and modern 
economies; classic theories of development (Leys, 1996) paid no 
attention to religion, simply because it seemed irrelevant to the 
processes they were analysing other than, perhaps, as an obstacle 
to modernisation. The European Union – and its predecessor, the 
European Community – has habitually based its development poli-
cies on this assumption. The present article argues in favour of giv-
ing attention to the role of religion in development, marking a new 
type of relationship between the European Union and Africa. 
The need to rethink some earlier assumptions concerning the rela-
tion between religion and development in the broadest sense has 
been apparent for some time, most notably since the Iranian revo-
lution of 1979. The latter event made clear that, at the very least, 
religion cannot be regarded as a force destined to retreat from 
public space in any society that aspires to a high degree of tech-
nological achievement or of sophistication. Since then it has been 
increasingly easy to find evidence of the dynamic role of religion 
in the public sphere in many parts of the world, and not only in 
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what used to be known as the Third World. Examples of momen-
tous political change in which religious forces and institutions 
have played a significant role include Poland, South Africa and 
the Philippines. They have also marked indelibly the history of the 
United States. Since the events of 9/11, the political role of religion 
has been the subject of worldwide debate. In regard to sub-Saharan 
Africa, religion played a role in deadly political and social conflicts 
even before 9/11, most obviously in Sudan and Nigeria. Since then, 
the sub-continent has sometimes been viewed as a new theatre of 
the ‘war on terror’ proclaimed by the US government.
Violent conflict, whether or not connected to religion, is generally 
recognised as an impediment to development. However, the role of 
religion in political conflict should not obscure its possible role as 
a significant factor in the development process (Ter Haar, 2005a), 
as we will discuss in the remainder of the present article. In sub- 
Saharan Africa, religion now forms arguably the most important 
connection with the rest of the world (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004; cf. 
Bayart, 2000). The potential role of religion as an agent of devel-
opment in this vast area has not escaped some leading European 
donor institutions. The Commission for Africa convened by the 
government of the United Kingdom gave substantial attention to 
the role of religion in its 2005 report entitled Our Common Interest 
(Commission for Africa, 2005: 127–9). The UK government’s own 
development arm, the Department for International Development 
(DFID), realising the importance of doing further research on this 
subject, has initiated a project called Faiths in Development, a mul-
ti-million pound research consortium. Similarly, the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has instituted a Knowledge Forum on Religion 
and Development Policy, and other European donor institutions, 
including some non-governmental organisations, are also known to 
have undertaken initiatives intended to explore the possible role of 
religion in the development process.2 The potential role of religion 
in regard to development has been discussed for some years now 
even by the main international financial institutions concerned 
with development, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Marshall and Keough, 2004; Marshall, 1998; Tyndale, 
2001a, 2001b).
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All of these initiatives can be understood as part of a wider shift 
away from a narrowly economic paradigm of development. The con-
cept of human development is now widely accepted. Human devel-
opment, according to the United Nations Development Programme, 
‘is about creating an environment in which people can develop 
their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord 
with their needs and interests’ (UNDP website). It thus refers to peo-
ple’s resources beyond any purely material and technocratic aspect. 
Most policymakers today accept that sustainable development can 
be achieved only if people build on their own resources. Logically, 
these assets should be considered to include not only intellectual 
and social resources, but also spiritual ones, if and when these are 
available. It is a fact that large numbers of people, particularly in 
developing countries, have a religious outlook on the world, in a 
sense that we briefly discuss below.
Moreover, it has become common in development cooperation to 
emphasise the importance of true partnerships in fostering a coop-
eration whose binding forces are said to be ‘solidarity and mutual 
respect’ (Commission for Africa, 2005: 89). If this is indeed so, it 
implies taking seriously people’s world-views and considering their 
potential for the development process as a whole. There are in any 
case eminently practical reasons for including religion within a 
broad concept of development, since religion provides a powerful 
motivation for many people to act in the ways they do. It equips 
many of the world’s people with the moral guidance and the will 
to improve their lives. Whether one regards religious belief as itself 
‘true’ or ‘untrue’ is hardly the point here. We wish simply to argue 
that religion, whatever form it takes, constitutes a social and politi-
cal reality.
The question, then, is whether religious and spiritual resources 
produce a type of knowledge that is, or could be, relevant to devel-
opment. One does not need to profess any religious belief, or to be 
religious in any sense, in order to explore this matter, as we intend 
to do in the present article. Our approach is broadly secular and 
sociological inasmuch as it does not imply that either the authors 
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or readers of this article are required to share the religious world-
views that we describe.
In the following paragraphs we will first consider how the concept 
of development may be viewed through the prism of religion and 
we will discuss what actually constitutes religion for most people 
in the developing world, including Africa. We will then move on 
to examine the role religion could play in specific areas of policy, 
including some that are specified by the Millennium Development 
Goals. It is particularly appropriate to debate such matters with 
regard to Africa, not only because it is the continent considered in 
greatest need of development, but also because it contains an enor-
mous diversity of religious and spiritual traditions, whose potential 
for development has hardly been considered.
RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT
A major obstacle to investigating the role of religion in develop-
ment is a widespread misunderstanding about what religion actu-
ally is (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: ch. 1). For most people in the world, 
including in Africa, ‘religion’ refers to a belief in the  existence of 
an invisible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, 
which is home to spiritual beings that are deemed to have effec-
tive powers over the material world (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 14). 
For people who hold this point of view, the invisible world is an 
integral part of the world, which can not be reduced to its visible 
or material form only. For them, the material world is linked to the 
spirit world, through the human spirit that is believed to be inher-
ent in every person; hence, a regular traffic is believed to take place 
between the human and the spirit worlds. In such a holistic percep-
tion of the world, it follows that people’s social relations extend 
into the invisible sphere. In the same way as they try and maintain 
good relations with their relatives, neighbours and friends for their 
own benefit, individuals and communities invest in their relations 
with spiritual entities so as to enhance the quality of their lives. 
Thus, people all over the world enter into various forms of active 
communication with a spirit world in such a way as to derive infor-
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mation or other resources from it with a view to furthering their 
material welfare or interests.
The above definition of religion fits Africa particularly well. 
Nevertheless, other definitions of religion exist, derived from dif-
ferent contexts. In modern Western societies, including in the 
European Union, religion is generally conceived rather differently. 
Religion is often equated exclusively with its institutional expres-
sion, which arises from the history of the Christian churches in 
Europe. Presumably for this reason, standard works on Africa’s 
modern history generally consider religion – if at all – in the form 
of organised religion, focussing for example on the role of the 
church in state politics. Moreover, definitions of religion in the 
West tend to frame religion in terms of the ultimate meaning that 
it is deemed to provide to human existence. (This is a definition 
particularly associated with the German-American theologian Paul 
Tillich, 1959). Definitions couched in such terms do not necessarily 
require a belief in invisible beings, such as gods, deities or spirits.
It is ironic in this regard that religion can be considered to be the 
historical point of departure for the modern concept of develop-
ment. The Indian economist Deepak Lal considers all social sci-
ence models to be ‘actually part of a culture-specific, proselytizing 
ethic of what remains at heart western Christendom’ (Lal, 2001: 3; 
Lal, 1998). Development, too, may be placed in this category inas-
much as it has incorporated a vision that is specifically Christian 
in origin, and that still bears the traces of its genealogy. Briefly, 
Christians traditionally believe in the prospect of a new and perfect 
world that will come into existence with the return of Christ to 
Earth. Over several centuries, politics and states in Europe assimi-
lated these originally Christian ideas of perfection (Burleigh, 2005). 
The cooptation of religious ideals by states and by political move-
ments led in the twentieth century to a variety of political projects 
that have been helpfully described as ‘coercive utopias’, secular 
ideologies that aspire to create a model society (Brzezinski, 1993: 
17). With hindsight, we may consider ‘development’ to have been 
one of the many coercive utopias of the twentieth century imposed 
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by modern states that have adopted some of the character and tech-
niques of religion.
The modern idea of development may be seen, then, as the secu-
lar translation of a millenarian belief, once general in Europe, 
concerning the construction of a perfect world. Inherent in this 
thinking are an aspiration to eliminate evil in all its forms from the 
earth and the belief that human beings will, eventually, be able to 
achieve this goal. Typical of modern secular thought – and inherent 
in the modern idea of development – is a related belief in progress. 
This, too, ultimately reflects a Christian idea of humankind as pil-
grims on the road in their final destination, where life will be as 
originally intended by its creator. In Europe, this religious notion 
of progress has become secularised in recent centuries and, more 
recently still, it has become limited to a view of material progress 
only.
In western Europe in particular, the secularisation of society has 
caused many people to overlook the original connection between 
religion and the notion of development. People who are religious, 
however, are more likely to make this connection. From a religious 
perspective, orthodox interpretations of development have notable 
shortcomings. Development experts, one commentator observed 
already a quarter of a century ago, seem to religious believers as 
‘one-eyed giants’, who ‘analyse, prescribe and act as if man could 
live by bread alone, as if human destiny could be stripped to its 
material dimensions alone’ (Goulet, 1980: 481). A Dutch develop-
ment economist has noted that development workers pay too much 
attention to the final goals rather than to the actual path by which 
these are achieved. In similar vein, he has identified a number of 
other contrasts between secular and religious approaches to devel-
opment (Goudzwaard, 2004). For present purposes, we do not wish 
to endorse, or even analyse, the criticisms most often heard from 
religious people in regard to development. We wish only to estab-
lish that such criticisms exist and have a bearing on the theory and 
practice of development.
Historically speaking, people in all parts of the world have assimi-
lated and adapted notions of development that were originally 
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conceived in Europe and that were exported largely through colo-
nial rule. Various societies have brought, and still bring, their 
own ideas to notions of development and progress. These ideas 
are often articulated in a religious idiom, not least because the 
notions of development and religion have so much in common. 
They both contain a vision of an ideal world and of the place of 
humans therein. It is not difficult to find examples of the ways in 
which people’s religious understanding of the world may have a 
bearing on development. The traditional Hindu idea of humankind, 
for example, emphasises harmony with the living environment. 
This easily translates into a view that economic growth should be 
integral to the well-being of the environment as a whole. Similarly, 
Muslims believe that the ultimate aim of life is to return humanity 
to its creator in its original state of purity. In African traditional 
religions, the pursuit of balance and harmony in relations with the 
spirit world is paramount. Charismatic Christians (of which there 
are large numbers in Africa and in developing countries more gen-
erally) believe that personal transformation – inner change – is the 
key to the transformation of society. All of these ideas help to shape 
people’s views of development. They stem from intellectual tradi-
tions associated with particular religions that have been formed by 
local histories.
In Africa, local histories include recent experiences of colonialism 
and nationalism, and often of authoritarianism and single-party 
rule as well. These were the historic vehicles for policies of develop-
ment that, in the case of Africa, have almost invariably been con-
ceived by their architects in a secular mode. In other words, actual 
development practices have generally not conformed to ideas that 
are central to the continent’s various religious traditions. We are 
not arguing that conforming to religious notions will automatically 
lead to better outcomes or better practices in matters of develop-
ment. All we are arguing is that, for effective development coop-
eration, it is necessary to take people’s own understanding of the 
world as a point of departure. The potential of religious ideas in 
the relationship between the European Union and Africa has hardly 
been explored by secular actors, either in regard to development 
or any other matter. While development agencies have certainly 
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worked with religious institutions and their leaders in many situ-
ations, notably in the fields of education and public health, they 
have devoted far less attention to the religious ideas that underlie 
the behaviour of religious believers and communities.
For analytical purposes, religious resources may be divided into 
four major categories, which can be applied to all the religious 
traditions in the world, in different constellations of importance. 
Religious ideas (what people actually believe) are one such category. 
Others are religious practices (ritual behaviour), religious organisa-
tion (how religious communities are formed and function), and reli-
gious – or spiritual – experiences (such as the subjective experience 
of inner change or transformation) (Ter Haar, 2005a: 22–7). All of 
these elements produce knowledge that, in principle, could be ben-
eficial to a community for development purposes. Many communi-
ties in Africa make spontaneous use of their religious resources in a 
variety of ways, a few of which we will briefly consider.
EXPLORING RELIGION FOR DEVELOPMENT
In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss a number of top-
ics that are widely debated in the literature on development, and 
which are also evoked in the Millennium Development Goals. In 
each case, we give some brief examples from Africa of how religious 
ideas are relevant to development.
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
There is general agreement that the large number of armed con-
flicts in Africa is a serious obstacle to development. Insofar as con-
ventional international approaches to conflict prevention and reso-
lution take religion into account, they tend to focus on the insti-
tutional aspects of religion. This particularly privileges the former 
mission churches, which, apart from having efficient bureaucracies, 
articulate a vision of the world in a language familiar to secular 
development experts, due to these churches’ continuing close rela-
tions with Europe.
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The fact remains, however, that for many Africans, religion is per-
ceived primarily in terms of interaction with a spirit world. This 
aspect of religion is hardly considered by international organisa-
tions engaged in peacebuilding. Yet ideas concerning a spirit world 
play a major role in both legitimising and discouraging violence. In 
many of Africa’s wars, fighters seek traditional medicines or other 
objects or substances that are believed to be channels of spiritual 
power. These are presumed to make the people who possess them 
effective in battle or to protect them from injury (Ellis, 2001). The 
persons who dispense such medicines exercise influence over the 
fighters, and in some cases this can take on a clear institutional 
form.
In Sierra Leone, for example, a militia was formed during the civil 
war of the 1990s that played a crucial role in subsequent events. 
This armed force, composed of fighters known as kamajors, was 
organised along the lines of the country’s traditional initiation soci-
eties, popularly known as ‘secret societies’. These secret societies 
initiate young people into adulthood, a process whereby they are 
considered to ‘die’ as children and to be reborn in a new form, as 
adults with new responsibilities. This process is associated with the 
acquisition of esoteric knowledge that is not to be divulged to non-
initiates. Initiation involves direct interaction with a spirit world 
by ritual means. During the war, senior officials of the country’s 
most influential traditional secret society, Poro, acted as initiators 
of young men as fighters in the kamajor militia. This is not an iso-
lated case, as similar uses of religious initiation for military pur-
poses have been widespread in recent wars in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Congo and elsewhere. The spiritual aspects of such military 
movements are essential to their very nature, and therefore have to 
be addressed if these movements themselves are to be understood 
(cf. Lan, 1985).
There are many African countries today in which state security forc-
es have lost any realistic claim to a national monopoly of violence, 
and where locally organised vigilantes or similar groups proliferate 
and sometimes receive a degree of official sanction. The kamajors, 
for example, were part of an officially-recognised Civil Defence 
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Force instituted by the Sierra Leonean government in 1997, and 
indeed the recognition of this new force was one of the factors that 
led to a coup by sections of the armed forces in May of that year. 
Some people saw the kamajors as heroes in fighting against an atro-
cious enemy, while others consider them to have been perpetrators 
of major human rights violations themselves. Whatever the case, 
it is clear that they enjoyed a real popularity in some communities 
and had ties to local stakeholders. These relationships were largely 
expressed in traditional religious form.
By the same token, the end of armed conflict in Africa is often 
accompanied by religious rituals designed to cleanse fighters from 
the pollution of bloodshed. This is not always done through tradi-
tional means, but may also take an Islamic or Christian form. In 
Liberia, charismatic churches often provide a forum where former 
childsoldiers can confess their crimes and, in a religious idiom that 
recalls the symbolism of traditional initiation, can be reintegrated 
into society. One 11-year old former fighter, for example, having 
been ‘born again’ in Christ, said he had ‘taken an oath never to 
kill again. I’m now a complete born-again Christian and a child of 
God’ (Osagie-Usman, 1994). It is interesting to note that the same 
idiom of being born again is central to both traditional initiation 
societies and charismatic Christianity. A rather different example 
of the use of religion in resolving conflict concerns South Africa, 
where the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was led by 
an Anglican archbishop and was closely associated with the coun-
try’s faith communities. The work of the TRC was based on the idea 
that long-term reconciliation depends crucially on religious notions 
of reconciliation and healing, even in the absence of formal justice. 
Although the TRC has been criticised in South Africa itself, its ulti-
mate success or failure will only become apparent with the passage 
of time. In the meantime, however, the TRC model has been widely 
imitated. Truth commissions have subsequently been created in 
Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where they have had a 
mixed record, and have been mooted in many other countries.
Almost invariably, traditional peacemakers in Africa base whatever 
authority they have on some form of spiritual legitimacy. There 
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have been attempts to identify traditional mechanisms of conflict 
resolution and harness them to international diplomatic initiatives 
(Zartman, 2000). Nevertheless, international efforts at peacemaking 
and peacebuilding in Africa have rarely involved such authorities 
for purposes of peace and reconciliation to any significant degree. 
Still less attention has been given to the fact that traditional peace-
makers may at the same time be organisers of war, such as the 
officials who initiate young men into a sodality like the kamajors 
and give them medicine believed to make them strong in battle by 
providing them with spiritual power.
Throughout Africa, the power attributed to religious experts is 
considered morally ambivalent, in the sense that their supposed 
spiritual power can be used both to harm and to heal. People who 
are believed to possess spiritual power can be organisers of violence 
as well as potentially helping to resolve conflict. This is one reason 
why traditional peacemaking techniques cannot be regarded by 
diplomats or international conflict resolution activists simply as 
an adjunct to a peace process that is conducted primarily through 
conventional diplomatic and political channels. It is commendable 
for diplomats, whether from the European Union or any other puta-
tive peacemaker, to include the most prominent religious figures in 
their programmes. However, they need to communicate with a far 
wider range of religious authorities, including both traditional spir-
itual authorities and leaders of the new religious movements that 
are flourishing in Africa (Netherlands Institute for International 
Relations, 2005). These have to be included in a regular programme 
of consultation and discussion with a view to preventing and 
understanding conflicts as much as resolving them.
Governance
Religion is part of the social fabric for most of the world’s people. 
Many voluntarily associate themselves with religious networks, 
which they use for a variety of purposes – social, political and eco-
nomic – that go beyond the strictly religious. Interestingly, many 
religious networks in Africa survive largely or entirely from tithes 
or other monies donated by their members: in effect, their ability 
to tax their own members or supporters is testimony to the success 
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of many religious organisations in developing a close bond with 
their adherents, and shows a degree of accountability to them. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the problems of revenue collection that 
are faced by states in Africa, often heavily reliant for their revenue 
on dues levied on import–export trade, or on external sources of 
funding, including aid. Most African states have a poor record in 
the collection of taxes from their own populations, making them 
unhealthily dependent on foreign sources of finance rather than 
on their own populations. The relationship between a state and its 
domestic tax-payers is an important element of real citizenship, so 
often observed to be lacking in African states, and so often felt to 
be an important ingredient in improved governance.
The question arises, then, whether religious networks are not 
assuming some of the functions normally attributed to govern-
ment, and whether this tendency may not increase in future. This 
is most relevant to the considerable number of African countries 
where the state exercises little real authority outside the main 
cities or a handful of nodal points, and where states have very lit-
tle ability to tax their nominal citizens. Something of the sort is 
clearly happening in the fields of health and education especially, 
where religious organisations have taken over responsibilities for 
welfare services that failing states can no longer fulfil. Many of 
the best-rooted non-state organisations have an explicit religious 
basis, whether it is in the form of educational establishments run 
by churches or by Muslim networks or, as mentioned, in vigilante 
movements underpinned by traditional initiation societies.
On closer inspection it is also apparent that many Africans in fact 
debate key political questions, including the fundamental legiti-
macy of their own governments, in religious or spiritual terms. It 
is important to note in this respect that a leader who is believed to 
have harnessed the power of the spirit world is widely seen as legiti-
mate (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: ch. 5). ‘Spiritual’ legitimacy, how-
ever, does not necessarily coincide with democratic legitimacy. This 
insight concerning the nature of the spirit world can not readily be 
gleaned from the academic literature on development, generally 
unfamiliar with the symbolic language of political legitimacy in 
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Africa. Such language is far more easily visible in the popular litera-
ture, videos and other published material that circulate all over the 
continent and that are widely consumed and discussed (e.g. Haynes, 
2006). Many publications of this sort discuss what in more conven-
tional language are considered problems of governance, crime and 
morality (Ellis and Ter Haar, 1998). In popular discourses, these 
problems are typically viewed as manifestations of evil, and debat-
ed not in the jargon of development, but in what might be termed 
a ‘spirit idiom’. The latter, like any unfamiliar language, has to be 
learned if it is to be understood.
Hence, in the considerable number of African countries in which 
government through efficient, centrally-controlled bureaucracies is 
clearly inadequate to ensure the country’s security, or to raise suf-
ficient resources through taxation to fund the reproduction of the 
state itself, or to ensure a minimum level of welfare for the coun-
try’s people, non-state organisations are destined to play a much 
greater role in future. This is almost certain to involve institutions 
of a religious nature and may be expressed in an idiom that is unfa-
miliar to many secular development agents.
Wealth Creation and Production
It is widely acknowledged that religious ideas played an important 
part in the development of capitalism in the history of Europe 
(Weber, 1992; cf. Tawney, 1964; Buchan, 1997). This was not prima-
rily as a result of direct action by religious institutions, but through 
the influence of religious ideas on people’s thinking concerning 
the legitimacy of wealth and the moral value of lending, saving 
or investing money, for example. It is by no means inevitable that 
other continents will develop along the same lines as Europe did, 
but recalling Europe’s history does have the merit of helping to 
illustrate the significance of current religious ideas in developing 
countries in forming people’s ideas about wealth. A good example 
is the emergence of the so-called ‘prosperity gospel’ in African char-
ismatic churches. The label ‘prosperity gospel’ has been applied by 
Western analysts to a strain of theology that considers financial 
success and material wealth as a gift of God to believers, and that 
these can be achieved by faith and prayer. This is a controversial 
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subject, since some authors consider the prosperity gospel prima-
rily as a form of wishful thinking or a distraction from more urgent 
business (Gifford, 2004). For an example from the Muslim world of 
religious networks that have become closely associated with eco-
nomic entrepreneurship, the Mourides of Senegal constitute a case 
that has been well documented (Cruise O’Brien, 1971).
Any talk of economic production in Africa has to take account 
of the central importance of land. At present, some two-thirds of 
people south of the Sahara live in rural areas, and many of these 
derive their living in part from agriculture, directly or indirectly. 
Although it is risky to generalise about a sub-continent as large and 
diverse as sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that many countries will 
not emerge as industrial producers or with internationally competi-
tive service sectors in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it remains 
as important as ever that agriculture be encouraged, notwithstand-
ing the formidable obstacles ranged against it. These include deser-
tification and climate change, the agricultural policies of govern-
ments in the European Union and the USA, and the tendency of 
many African governments, for political reasons, to favour urban 
sectors at the expense of ruraldwellers.3
People’s ideas about the proper use and ownership of land, too, are 
often expressed in terms of religion. This may take the form of a 
belief that land is made fertile by the spirits of ancestors. Religious 
beliefs of this sort are often seen as obstacles to development, such 
as in those places where traditional forms of landholding preclude 
women from ownership of land or even place taboos on the owner-
ship of agricultural implements by women, despite the key role 
they often play in cultivation. There are also many examples of tra-
ditional chiefs having the authority to grant land while retaining 
the right to recall its use, powers that are evidently open to abuse. 
In some cases, particular ethnic groups may traditionally be forbid-
den from owning land but may enjoy usufruct rights only. This 
principle has in fact played a role in violent conflicts in Liberia and 
Côte d’Ivoire.4
All of these are examples of traditional concepts concerning land-
holding that may offend against current ideas concerning universal 
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human rights. They may also be in contradiction to Western-style 
systems of individual land tenure guaranteed by law. It is thus 
no solution to argue for the preponderance of traditional forms 
of landholding over modern ones inspired by Western models. 
Rather, what is required is to consider what elements of traditional 
thought, characteristically expressed in a religious or spiritual 
idiom, might usefully be adapted for development purposes. This 
reflection must consider contemporary ideas of justice and human 
rights as well as modern demands of agricultural efficiency. Much 
more research is necessary on the religious aspects of this matter.
Health and Education
Throughout Africa, there is a widespread supposition that people 
in need of healing include not only those with obvious physical ail-
ments, but also those who are suffering from vaguer problems that 
in clinical medicine might be diagnosed as psychological problems, 
including stress or depression. In Africa, both illness and healing 
are generally viewed as holistic in nature, requiring attention to 
the spiritual as well as physical aspects of a person. For this reason, 
religion plays an important role in health care in Africa generally. 
This strongly suggests the need to integrate spiritual ideas into 
health-care policies.
Analysis of people’s ideas about health may also reveal a great deal 
about popular perceptions of relations between donor countries 
and Africa. For example, although the means by which HIV/AIDS is 
transmitted are widely understood, Africans often suggest that the 
disease may have been deliberately exported to the continent by 
Western countries intent on depopulating Africa, or that ’aid’ and 
‘AIDS’ are related phenomena. Such ideas are clearly misguided, 
but they do reveal a great deal about how many Africans perceive 
their relationship with the West (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 45–7). 
Whatever one’s opinions of these views, development policy needs 
to take account of them. Differences in perceptions of illness and 
healing sometimes lead to outcomes that surprise Western ana-
lysts, such as the occasionally progressive role played by traditional 
imams, in Mali and elsewhere, where even conservative clerics have 
been prominent in the fight against AIDS.
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Generally speaking, health and education constitute an area in 
which the role of religious institutions has already been widely 
noted by development experts, notably in the field of service 
delivery. The scope of religious institutions in welfare provision is 
currently further expanding through the rapidly-growing activity 
of Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. The total number of Islamic NGOs operating south 
of the Sahara, according to one leading source, increased from 138 
out of a total of 1,854 NGOs in 1980, to 891 out of 5,896 20 years 
later (Salih, 2002: 11). Many of the most dynamic Muslim NGOs 
nowadays combine proselytisation with the provision of welfare 
services and even a high standard of technical education, rather as 
Christian missionary organisations have traditionally done. Some 
modern Islamic schools in West Africa offer business studies and 
computer courses as part of their curriculum (LeBlanc, 1999: 493–
4), as do some modern Christian institutions, particularly in charis-
matic circles (Larbi, 2001: 347–8).
The rise of Islamic NGOs often causes nervousness among Western 
governments due to the suspicion that any form of Islamic activism 
could be tainted by association with terrorism. Development offi-
cials need to discriminate clearly between Islamic NGOs or other 
organisations that can play a constructive role in development 
and the small number that are inclined towards violence. A sensi-
ble way for the European Union to do this would be to work with 
Islamic NGOs wherever this is feasible, learning what they do, and 
gaining an ability to distinguish those that are relevant for develop-
ment purposes from those that are not. This is particularly impor-
tant in view of the vast numbers of Muslims in Africa.
These four sketches, drawing on African examples, are intended to 
illustrate the potential for religion in promoting development in 
key policy areas. As we have noted, it is widely accepted in policy 
circles that any effective and lasting development should build on 
people’s own resources. These include, we argue, not only material 
and intellectual resources, but also people’s religious or spiritual 
resources.
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NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
If poor countries are to develop, it is not so much new policy instru-
ments that are needed, but rather a new vision of what develop-
ment means, and how it should be implemented. People’s full 
range of resources should provide the foundation for any develop-
ment strategy. Among these, we have argued, are people’s religious 
and spiritual resources. They play a role in each of the four areas 
examined in the previous section – the need for peace and security, 
the quality of governance, economic growth, and health and educa-
tion – widely considered as key to development.
This is not only a matter of intellectual interest, but also of prac-
tical value. In many of Africa’s poorest countries, effective, cen-
tralised bureaucracies hardly exist. Some of the countries in this 
condition are commonly referred to as ‘failed states’ or ‘poor gov-
ernance countries’, recently defined by the US National Intelligence 
Council (2005) as ‘those where basic government institutions have 
decayed to the point where they cannot make governance deci-
sions’. In countries of this type, power is, literally, disintegrated. It 
becomes a matter of necessity rather than choice to consider how 
development could be enhanced by using the resources in society 
at large. Many of the communities or social networks that carry the 
burden of development have a religious form or convey religious 
ideas in some sense. In any event, some theorists of globalisation 
argue that communities throughout the world are now becoming 
‘network societies’, ceasing to be organised along characteristi-
cally modernist lines (Castells, 1998). Moreover, some observers 
with experience of African politics believe that restoring peace and 
order to conflict-torn regions will require networks of governance 
that transcend the boundaries of sovereign states (Sawyer, 2004). 
In Africa, the continent with the greatest number of ‘failed states’, 
the lack of effective bureaucracies has a particularly deep historical 
resonance. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where religion tradition-
ally played a central role in governance, prior to the imposition 
of colonial government modelled on European ideas concerning 
the separation of religion and politics. Africa’s traditional forms of 
government were associated with relationships between individuals 
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and social groups, usually expressed in what we refer to above as a 
‘spirit idiom’. Authority over the spirit world thus translated into 
authority over people, making religion an outstanding means of 
instrumentalising political power by dominating webs of relations 
over a wide area. Hence, political power was traditionally exercised 
through essentially religious techniques which enabled rulers 
to command material aspects of power, such as armed force and 
rights of taxation. These older traditions of governance continue 
to have an effect on African politics today (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 
24).
In view of this historical background, the question arises how, in 
practical terms, religious networks or institutions could contribute 
to development. It is important to emphasise that religious net-
works cannot be considered as a simple substitute for an effective 
bureaucracy. Regarding such networks primarily as implementers 
of development plans may be useful at times, but does not itself 
amount to the fundamental rethinking of development policy that 
we are advocating. New strategies in development cooperation 
should take the spiritual dimension of a community into account, 
for example by supporting faith-based organisations at the grass-
roots level, not regarding them as service-deliverers only, but also 
affirming them in positive aspects of their spiritual vision (Cordaid 
et al., 2006). 
As with civil society more generally, religious networks or institu-
tions do not constitute a ‘magic bullet’, the missing element that 
can make policy successful in the absence of an efficient state or 
other bureaucracy. If religious networks are to make a positive 
contribution, it can only be in the context of a different strategy on 
the part of development organisations themselves. This also applies 
to the European Union, whose Economic Partnership Agreements 
are based on conventional strategies that take little account of 
Africans’ world-views. The key to using the human resources vested 
in social networks for purposes of development is the establish-
ment of long-term partnerships between external development 
agents and social networks in Africa. Given the importance of reli-
gion in Africa, this must include religious networks. It is encourag-
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ing to note in this regard that the formation of long-term partner-
ships is one of the stated goals of the Commission for Africa (2005: 
370–71).
However, there are at least two major characteristics of interna-
tional development bureaucracies that militate against long-term 
approaches of the sort advocated. First, international development 
officials, like other functionaries, tend to derive prestige from the 
size of the budgets they administer. A senior official of a develop-
ment agency typically has a budget of millions of dollars at his or 
her disposal, and an administrator with a smaller budget is likely 
to derive correspondingly less prestige. But in many African situa-
tions quite small amounts of money are often preferable to large 
amounts, as African societies have only a limited capacity to absorb 
capital (cf. Rimmer, 2003). Second, desk officers or unit directors 
based in Western capitals (or even in the African capital cities) may 
have little time and inclination to spend long periods becoming 
acquainted with key members of religious networks and establish-
ing the mutual trust that is necessary to develop ideas together. In 
other words, if the development of Africa is to be taken seriously, it 
will require at least some categories of Western officials to change 
their mode of operation quite fundamentally.
If development were to be based on long-term partnerships with 
a strong social component, this would have implications not only 
for Africa, but also for donor countries in the European Union. 
European governments and other donor bodies that, we are sug-
gesting, will need to explore the role of religion in development, 
are all, to a greater or lesser extent, secular bodies that respect a 
formal separation between the spheres of religion and politics. 
Institutions such as DFID and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that have recently launched research projects on religion and devel-
opment risk causing offence to some people in their own countries 
(and even some of their own employees) by their initiatives, since 
public opinion in Europe generally considers the rigorous separa-
tion of church and state as a matter of principle. Hence, both DFID 
and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically point out that 
their wish to investigate the potential role of religion in develop-
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ment should not be taken to imply that they have themselves aban-
doned their secular nature and outlook.
Even with such a disclaimer, however, any sustained attention to 
the role of religion in development is bound to change the nature 
of donor institutions in time. This matter is all the more delicate in 
that – uncomfortably for European donor countries – development 
problems are clearly related to questions of international migra-
tion. These days substantial numbers of people from the developing 
world live in Europe, where religious ideas and networks that are 
conspicuously global in outlook help to sustain African diasporas. 
Through remittances, African migrants in Europe make a major 
contribution to the economies of their countries of origin (Manuh, 
2005; Ter Haar, 2005b). Part of these remittances find their way 
through religious networks that link Africa and Europe, providing 
an infrastructure that could be used for development purposes. 
Traditional mainline churches are the most obvious example of 
this, having solid historical connections in Africa as a result of their 
missionary past. Furthermore, many churches created in Africa 
itself nowadays have missionary branches in Europe (Ter Haar, 
1998). Muslim networks show similar features, especially with the 
rise of Islamic NGOs funded from Arabia and the Gulf states. At the 
same time, some Africa-based Muslim groups have shown them-
selves equally adept at creating new religious networks in Europe. 
There are even African traditional religious believers that have cre-
ated networks overseas. The development potential of African reli-
gious networks in Europe has hardly been explored.
There is thus a strong link between the development of Africa, the 
position of African migrants in Europe, and the ease of communica-
tion and movement between the two continents. Diasporas play a 
substantial part in the politics of many African countries, and con-
tribute to their economies through the provision of remittances. As 
has become painfully evident, religious networks among diaspora 
communities in Europe can also pose problems of a political and 
social nature. This is particularly the case because politics and pub-
lic administration in Europe have evolved over a long period on the 
basis of a separation of the spheres of religion and politics. This is 
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a further reason why involving religious networks in development 
will have an effect on donor countries themselves, since it will 
bring European governments into a new relationship with religious 
networks among African migrant communities.
CONCLUSION
We have argued in this article that religion, widely acknowledged 
as an emerging force in world affairs, has the potential to play a 
positive role in the development process, as some European poli-
cymakers are beginning to perceive. We have briefly described the 
role that religion could play in regard to four sectors acknowledged 
to be of importance in development policy.
We have emphasised that this is not a plea for adding religious 
institutions or networks to the list of existing instruments by 
which development policies are implemented. Rather, the core 
of the argument here presented is that European development 
policy needs to be rethought in terms of the world-views of those 
most immediately concerned, the very people whom development 
policies seek to assist. In Africa, religion is central to people’s 
world-views. The growing role of religion in public space in Africa 
represents a form of historical continuity with the continent’s 
deeper past (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: ch. 9). Should policymakers 
and development agents pursue a path of greater cooperation with 
religious networks, it will mean lending serious attention to reli-
gious world-views, with which they may be unfamiliar or even feel 
uncomfortable. This last point needs to be considered in the light of 
the observation made by one analyst that many of the major flaws 
in the development process arise from a failure to consider the met-
aphysical questions concerning human life (Tyndale, 2001b: 3). In 
effect, these should provide the framework for any serious debate 
about the aims of development, about how to measure progress, 
and how to understand the ‘good life’.
Taking the development potential of religion seriously would have 
major consequences not only for the terms in which development 
68
is considered, but also for forms of government in Europe itself. We 
are not suggesting that European governments renounce the prin-
ciple of separation of church and state, so hard-won in European 
history; we propose only that they consider anew how to shape the 
relationship between politics and religion. The fundamental reason 
for this is the continuing importance in Africa of religion, in the 
sense that we have defined it.
‘The role of religion in development: Towards a new relationship 
between the European Union and Africa’, The European Journal of 
Development Research, vol. 18, no. 3, 2006,  pp. 351-67 (with S. Ellis) 
[Winner of the EJDR Prize 2006]. 
NOTES
1. Gerrie ter Haar is professor of Religion, Human Rights and Social Change at 
the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Stephen Ellis is a senior researcher 
at the African Studies Centre, Leiden. Some aspects of this paper are a devel-
opment of ideas first sketched in a paper entitled ‘Religion and Development 
in Africa’ that was commissioned by the secretariat of the Commission 
for Africa and published on its website, <www.commissionforafrica.org>, 
although as at 13 February 2006 it could no longer be found there (see 
Commission for Africa, 2005: 405).
 The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.18, No.3, September 
2006, pp.351–367 ISSN 0957-8811 print/ISSN 1743-9728 online
 DOI: 10.1080/09578810600893403 q 2006 European Association of 
Development Research and Training Institutes
2.  One example is the new Knowledge Centre on Religion and Development ini-
tiated by a number of non-governmental organisations and academic institu-
tions in the Netherlands: see ,www. stichtingoikos.nl and www.religion-and-
development.nl..
3.  We view the latter primarily as a political issue. However, the phenomenon 
of ‘urban bias’ has been discussed largely by economists (see notably Byres, 
1979). The notion of urban bias is particularly associated with Lipton, 1977. 
For the relevance of this discussion for Africa, see esp. Karshenas, 2001. 
4.  It is remarkable that in a special issue of the European Journal of 
Development Research on ‘Securing Land Rights in Africa’ (2002), there is 
no consideration of the role of religion other than a passing mention in one 
paper, on Zimbabwe.
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ENCHANTMENT AND IDENTITY: 
AFRICAN CHRISTIANS IN EUROPE
Introduction
The notion that disenchantment is an inevitable by-product of mod-
ernisation has occupied a central place in the thinking not only 
of European social scientists, but also of policy-makers and large 
parts of the general public.  It is therefore with some surprise that 
Europeans have noted evidence of what appears to be a partial re-
enchantment of their societies.  This process is most closely associ-
ated with the adoption of religious rhetoric, religious practice and 
displays of religious affiliation in public space by groups of immi-
grant origin, especially Muslims.  European countries have respond-
ed in distinctive ways to this trend, according to their specific tradi-
tions of separating church and state, or the realms of religion and 
politics. The rapid politicisation of Islam in every part of Europe has 
highlighted the continuing importance of religion for many people 
in the world, adding new complexities to the considerations of gov-
ernment policy-makers and academic analysts.
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The present article deals with the dynamism of religious belief and 
practice not among Muslims, but among Christian immigrants, in 
this case of African origin.1 In brief, I will argue that the religious 
dynamism has nothing to do with a process of re-enchantment 
among the people concerned, since they were never disenchanted 
in the first place. Any analysis in those terms diverts attention from 
the pivotal role that religion has always played, and continues to 
play, in Africa. In the case of those particular communities that I 
studied in some detail over ten years ago — namely Africans living 
in the Netherlands, especially Amsterdam — I further argue that the 
salience of their Christian commitment is not related to an attempt 
to preserve their African identities.  On the contrary, I argue, the 
notion that African Christians represent a specifically ethnic form 
of religious community is, in the case of the Netherlands, more 
accurately seen as an attempt of Dutch society to preserve its own 
original identity. The argument may be extended to other coun-
tries in Europe with substantial numbers of African immigrant 
Christians, as part of a more widespread negotiation concerning 
the inclusion or exclusion of groups of immigrant origin. 
Why Africa is Not Re-enchanted
The people who most readily perceive large areas of the world to 
be undergoing a process of re-enchantment appear to be observ-
ers who are themselves from societies that have become secular-
ised, notably in Western Europe. This provides them with a very 
particular perspective from which to view the world, but not one 
that is generally representative.  In regard to Africa, a more fruit-
ful approach to matters of religion should start with consider-
ing Africa’s religious dynamics in the context of the continent’s 
own history.  I have argued elsewhere (Ellis, Ter Haar, 2004)2 that 
the historically entrenched relationship between politics, society 
and religion in Africa was marked by colonial rule. At that time, 
European administrators adopted a secular approach to matters 
of public policy that they thought to be an appropriate means of 
governing societies in Africa, as well as in other parts of the world, 
neglecting the fact that religion played traditionally a role in the 
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governance of these societies. In retrospect, the separation of reli-
gion and politics that was characteristic of the colonial approach 
to governance may be seen never to have been much more than 
superficial.  Recent manifestations of apparent religious revival in 
Africa are therefore not to be interpreted as evidence that Africa is 
re-enchanting (never having been disenchanted in the first place), 
but rather that it is re-connecting with its pre-colonial past.  The 
perceived revival of religion may also reflect a reaction to mod-
ernisation and development as these were experienced in Africa in 
the decades after 1945 — an observation that is quite often made 
regarding Islamic movements in the Middle East.  The processes 
of modernisation and development that dominated government 
policy from the late colonial period through the first years of inde-
pendence effected enormous changes in people’s lives in the space 
of just one or two generations, including as a result of huge demo-
graphic growth, migration from the country to the city, the decline 
of agrarian economies and the disruption of agrarian patterns of 
life and religious culture. Yet, the changes subsumed under the 
terms ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ did not bring the type of 
progress and prosperity that many people in Africa had expected. 
Ironically, this is one of the main reasons why so many Africans 
have left their country in recent years to try their economic luck in 
Europe, bringing their religion with them. It is mostly migrants of 
this sort, overwhelmingly young, that are responsible for the large 
number of new Christian  congregations that have sprung up in all 
the countries where they have settled.
Hence, the idea of re-enchantment does not provide a suitable 
analytical tool for understanding the religious dynamics in Africa 
as well as the new religious dynamics in Europe associated with 
African immigrants. The concept of re-enchantment has been prop-
agated notably by anthropologists lacking a historical approach to 
the concept of religion itself.  In the following paragraphs, there-
fore, I will first discuss the concept of religion, both in a general 
sense and with specific reference to (sub-Saharan) Africa. I will then 
continue to discuss the dynamics of religious change in Africa, 
and how these affect other parts of the world, notably Europe. In 
doing so, I will make extensive use of my earlier research concern-
75
ing the so-called African religious diaspora,3 as notably recorded in 
my book Halfway to Paradise. I will argue that reference to African 
religion(s), as a separate category, is increasingly loosing signifi-
cance in a globalising world and may serve political aims. This is 
clearly manifested in the case of African Christians in contempo-
rary Europe, who tend to identify themselves first and foremost as 
global Christians. 
What Is Religion?
Our common understanding of religion is largely defined by a 
Western perception of the world and coloured by the intellectual 
traditions of Europe and North America.  Hence, a modern interpre-
tation of religion that has become popular in the West is religion 
as ‘ultimate concern’. This is a term coined in the 1960s by the 
German-American theologian Paul Tillich - and also elaborated by 
the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz - by which religion is 
explained and defined in terms of an ultimate system of meaning.  
Through religion, it is suggested, human beings create a cosmos, a 
universe that is not a chaos but an orderly system that gives mean-
ing and direction to people’s lives. Such a view represents the latest 
trend in the academic endeavour of defining religion that started 
with the nineteenth-century British anthropologist E.B. Tylor, 
who defined religion simply and succinctly as a ‘belief in spiritual 
beings’. Central to Tylor’s definition is the communicative relation-
ship between believers and the invisible beings in whose existence 
they believe. ‘Beings’ are like persons: they are approachable and 
they can be addressed. Communication and interaction with them 
is presupposed not only in Tylor’s definition, but also those of the 
many scholars who have defined religion in similar terms, namely 
with the emphasis on the relationship between human beings and 
spiritual beings (Platvoet,1999)4. It is this type of definition - rather 
than the historically more recent Tillich/Geertz type - that speaks to 
the reality of religion in Africa (as well as many other parts of the 
world, for that matter). 
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Religion, thus, is a concept open to different interpretations that 
are dependent on local context and specific history.  In the case 
of Africa, religion refers to a belief in the existence of an invis-
ible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one, that is 
home to spirit(ual) beings with effective powers over the material 
world.  It implies that active communication is possible between 
the human and the spirit worlds, in a form of dialogical exchange. 
Other than in most Western-Christian ideas of religion, there is 
no perceived relation of dependency between the human and the 
spirit worlds. Human beings can influence the attitude of spirit 
beings through their own behaviour, in such a way as to further 
their material interests. This is important because the spirit world 
is the locus of power. Spiritual power is real and effective power for 
those who believe in it. For many Africans, power in the material 
world cannot be separated from its source in the spiritual world.  
This provides a major reason, for example, for African politicians 
to meddle in the spirit world, an observation that is not relevant to 
Africa only, but appears of much wider application. Religion and 
politics are both ways of thinking about, organising, and accessing 
power. Both are always in competition to some extent, since they 
have rather similar functions in the deployment of power, itself an 
invisible and elusive entity.  
Religion - in the defined sense - has ever been absent from Africa.  
It may be considered to be undergoing a ‘revival’ only in the sense 
that religion is occupying public space in Africa in a manner that 
is historically unprecedented, but that does show some interesting 
continuities with pre-colonial times. Africa’s formal institutions 
of government were almost without exception originally colonial 
creations. In colonial times, they corresponded to Western ideas 
about how institutions of government should function, about the 
need for secular states and the separation of politics and religion in 
national government. Such a view was continued by the first gener-
ation of African nationalists.  What we now see, basically since the 
end of the cold war in 1989, is religion re-entering public space as 
people search for new sources of legitimacy and power, including 
politicians themselves. 
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The democratisation movement of the 1990s has been very impor-
tant in projecting religion in the public realm. It was associated 
with the collapse of political ideologies that had previously been 
dominant and had divided Africa basically into two ideological 
power blocks, associated with either the liberal Western world or 
the Communist world. The loss of these secular ideologies created 
space for the emergence of religious ideologies and the emergence 
of spiritual movements into political space, as people sought alter-
native sources of authority and at the same time were freed from 
the institutional constraints that were previously imposed on them 
by single-party governments.  The important point in this regard is 
that many forms of what is often seen from the outside as religious 
revival challenge the very basis of legitimacy of states that oper-
ate through institutions and norms of governance originally cre-
ated in colonial times. Not only do these colonial institutions lack 
legitimacy because they have become increasingly ineffective, but 
also because in the view of those concerned they are seen as having 
little or no spiritual basis. Today this has become notably visible 
in the various Islamic movements that contest the authority of the 
secular state. 
  Hence, the perceived ‘re-enchantment of the world’ may be better 
described as a reconfiguration of available resources - both mate-
rial and spiritual - for a successful life today.  The enhanced public 
and political importance of religion should not be confused with 
a return to the past, nor considered as an anachronism, not even 
when it takes forms that have historical roots extending to pre-
colonial times. Contemporary religious revivals mark a re-ordering 
of religion and politics, sometimes -or even quite often - recalling 
older indigenous patterns. It is therefore important not to look at 
religion in Africa in isolation, but to insist instead on paying due 
regard to religious ideologies in relation to political practice in 
Africa today.
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Religious Change in Africa
The concept of re-enchantment also obscures the fact that the 
religious traditions of Africa have always been characterised by 
dynamics of change that have allowed them throughout the ages to 
incorporate and absorb new ideas and practices, and new human 
and spirit beings. This can be seen not only in the ways in which 
Islam and Christianity have become part of the religious heritage 
of Africa, but also in the creative acceptance and re-creation of new 
religious movements, such as Oriental ones. In particular, this crea-
tive dynamic has led to the continuing strength of what is generally 
known - academically and in popular speech - as African traditional 
religions, a term that has contributed strongly to the perception 
of African religions as basically static - or at the best of times open 
to micro-change - and a-historical, and for the bearers of these reli-
gions to be seen as passive recipients of any ‘modern’ impulses that 
happen to come their way. Conventional academic speech regard-
ing Africa helps to maintain the myth that Africa is a continent 
that has been left virtually untouched by meaningful historical 
change of the sort acknowledged in respect of most other parts of 
the world. Hence, in conformity with general images of traditional 
society, African indigenous religions - or, community religions as 
I prefer to call them, following others in my discipline - have long 
been seen as more or less self-contained units, which can be studied 
in isolation. This frequently creates the impression that historical 
influence on such societies and their religions has occurred only in 
modern times and as a result of contact with the Western world.  
Among many other things, this denies what is often referred to 
today as Africans’ own ‘agency’. 
The developments described and discussed below provide a telling 
example of the point I am trying to make. On the basis of extensive 
research conducted in Nigeria, Rosalind Hackett speaks of a process 
of revitalisation of traditional religion in twentieth-century Africa.  
She identifies the following five key tendencies in the process: a 
tendency to universalisation, to modernisation, to commerciali-
sation, to politicisation, and to individualisation. The tendency 
towards universalisation is tantamount to an effort to enhance 
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the attractiveness of African community religions and to increase 
their reach outside the particular group where a specific religion 
first came into existence. The tendency to modernisation takes 
various forms, for example that of a reform movement that propa-
gates elements such as peace, stability and justice. The tendency 
to politicisation can often be encountered among government and 
political leaders in search of means of buttressing their power and 
authority. The tendency to commercialisation is apparent as part of 
a process whereby particular elements of traditional religions are, 
as it were, manufactured — developed into products and offered on 
the market for sale. The tendency to individualisation marks a shift 
from a public-oriented approach to a more person-centred one. 
One might also see these tendencies, as I would be inclined to do, 
as various expressions of what others have called ‘modernity’.  We 
may even consider such tendencies as ‘instances of secularisation’ 
within the sphere of African traditional religions, provided we are 
prepared to use the term ‘secularisation’ as a concept of family 
resemblance only and bearing in mind that the term can only be 
used meaningfully if one accepts that a clear distinction can be 
made between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’, which is question-
able in many cases concerning Africa. Yet, if with this in mind we 
compare Hackett’s five tendencies with the five conceptions of secu-
larisation distinguished by the American philosopher Larry Shiner,  
we can see that at least two of the five tendencies fit the model. In 
short, secularisation, in Shiner’s view, is conceived as (i) the decline 
of religion, (ii) ‘conformity with the world’ (that is, a preoccupation 
with the material world), (iii) the desacralisation of the world, (iv) 
the disengagement of society from religion, and (v) the transposi-
tion of beliefs and patterns of behaviour from the ‘religious’ to the 
‘secular’ sphere. If we apply this to the specific context of Africa, we 
may find some analytical meaning in the distinction between the 
religious and the secular, which is otherwise of little importance. 
Conformity with the world (ii) and the transposition of beliefs and 
patterns of behaviour from the religious to the secular sphere (v) 
are both implied in the tendencies to commercialisation and politi-
cisation especially. Thus we see once again the inappropriateness 
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of the term re-enchantment in regard to Africa, where there is no 
historical divide between the religious and the secular.  
Religious change in Africa has taken on yet another dimension 
in recent years with the emergence of African-initiated churches 
worldwide, including in Europe. This may be seen as another 
expression of the tendency to universalisation that was described 
above regarding Africa’s indigenous religions.  This time it is relat-
ed to one of the most remarkable trends of our time, the scope and 
size of international migration. This includes migration from sub-
Saharan Africa.
African Christians in Europe: Religion and Identity 
In the last two decades, African immigrants have spread over virtu-
ally all industrialised countries of Western and northern Europe. 
One unexpected result of Africans’ migration to Europe has been 
the foundation of new Christian congregations in all the places 
where they have settled, thus adding a new (and unexpected) 
dimension to Europe’s multicultural society.  In view of contem-
porary discussions on multiculturalism and the recognition of 
religion, the question emerges of how relevant the issue of African 
identity is to African Christians in Europe and how this relates to 
their religious – that is, Christian - identity.  
Today, churches founded by Africans - or: African-initiated church-
es - exist all over Europe. Many - if not most - of these have been 
founded as independent congregations, that is, independent from 
the mainline churches in the host country.  The commonest way 
for outsiders to refer to these new churches in Europe is as ‘African 
churches’, a label often rejected by the churches themselves on 
the grounds that it marks a restriction of their task and mission 
in Europe since, as far as they are concerned, they aim to minis-
ter to both Africans and non-Africans, to black and white people.  
Most churches in fact label themselves as ‘international churches’, 
expressing their aspiration to be part of the international world 
in which they believe themselves to have a universal task.5 Just as 
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European missionaries once believed in their divine task of bring-
ing the gospel to Africa, African church leaders in Europe are today 
convinced of their mission to bring the gospel back to those who 
originally provided them with it. For many African Christians, 
therefore, migration to Europe is not just an economic necessity, 
but also seen as a God-given opportunity to evangelise among those 
whom they believe to have gone astray. To them, Europe is as the 
‘valley of dry bones’ described in the vision of the prophet Ezekiel,6 
and will be dependent on Africa for its renewed vitality. 
The emergence of African congregations in Europe marks a new 
phase in the history of African independent churches, commonly 
known in the literature as AIC’s. Since their emergence on the 
African continent, the term ‘African Independent Churches’ has 
been widely used to describe a type of churches whose main char-
acteristic is that they are founded and led by black Africans.  Their 
origin dates from the late nineteenth century and is related to 
the conditions of that time. They range in size from some tens of 
people in small local congregations to thousands or even millions 
of members in large well-established institutions such as the Zion 
Christian Church (ZCC) in South Africa and neighbouring countries, 
or the Church of  Jesus Christ on Earth through the prophet Simon 
Kimbangu, commonly known as the Kimbanguist Church, that 
has also spread to Europe. The same is true, for example, of some 
Nigerian churches, such as the Church of the Lord (Aladura), com-
monly known as the Aladura Church, and the Celestial Church of 
Christ. 
However, the name ‘African Independent Churches’ is not a self-
chosen name but a label originally imposed by outsiders, namely 
representatives of the historic mainline churches. These are the 
former European mission churches that, until a century or so ago, 
held a monopoly in the field of church development in Africa.  The 
‘I’ for ‘independent’ originally reflected the viewpoint of these 
traditional mainline churches, who considered the independent 
churches as having broken away from the mother churches. In 
more recent times, a shift in influence from the traditional main-
line churches to the so-called independent churches expressed 
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itself in the new, self-chosen name of African indigenous churches. 
This is not just a question of words. The change of name reflects 
a change of emphasis from the outsider’s position to that of the 
insider. From the insider’s point of view, the aspect of separation 
from a mother church is not relevant. What counts is establishing a 
self-image, in this case as an indigenous church, creating one’s own 
identity in the process.
 In the course of time new appellations have emerged from within 
the AICs themselves, that altered the meaning of the letter ‘I’. Thus 
AIC’s have also become known  as African-instituted churches, 
and as African-initiated churches, representing different historical 
angles from which the phenomenon can be viewed, while in all 
cases retaining the same acronym of AIC.  This shows to the outside 
world that in effect most, if not all, churches in Africa are today 
under the leadership of Africans, including the former mission 
churches in Africa. By using the same acronym but interpreting 
the letter ‘I’ with different words, one may see how the status of 
these churches has changed throughout the century. The changes 
of name are an eloquent statement of the dynamics of this particu-
lar history.7 The new African-initiated churches in Europe, I have 
suggested in my book Halfway to Paradise, represent a new type of 
AIC’s in this history.  To do justice to the historic change implied 
in the worldwide spread of African-initiated churches, I have pro-
posed to invest the initials ‘AIC’ with a new meaning, namely that 
of African International Churches. To refer to them this way takes 
account of their African origin while at the same time recognising 
the continuity of these churches with the universal Christian tradi-
tion. In any event, this outlook accords with that of members of 
the churches themselves, who are conscious of having entered the 
international field. 
It remains striking that the conventional way of writing about 
African-initiated churches outside Africa is to refer to them in eth-
nic terms, even though ethnic labels are commonly not indicated 
in the names of the churches concerned. The interesting question 
is why this is so.  With specific reference to the situation in the 
Netherlands, I have argued that the discussion regarding the need 
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for African Christians in Europe to develop their ‘own’ identity as 
African Christians is being led by their European counterparts and 
serves European rather than African interests. African Christians 
in the Netherlands identify themselves first and foremost as 
Christians and only in the second instance as Africans or African 
Christians. In their own view, their adherence to Christianity con-
stitutes the most important element of their public identity. Yet, 
there is a general tendency in the Netherlands to separate African 
Christians from their Dutch counterparts by insisting on their 
perceived African identity, while ignoring their shared Christian 
identity. In effect, this tendency leads to the segregation of Africans 
in Dutch society and as such is in striking contrast to the general 
demand for the integration of foreigners. 
 
In the Netherlands, this practice conforms to a long tradition in 
Dutch society where the development of specific group identities 
has been the mainstay of the country’s social and political system. 
This system has served the Netherlands well in the past in provid-
ing political stability and a high degree of legal tolerance, but it 
is also worth noting that it provided some of the intellectual basis 
for the South African system of apartheid.  In the latter case – and 
unlike the Netherlands - a specific identity was imposed on, and 
not defined by, the people concerned. It takes us back to the vital 
question of whether an identity is self-imposed or imposed by oth-
ers, and whose interests are served in respective cases. In other 
words, my research findings concerning African Christians in the 
Netherlands support the thesis proposed by Charles Taylor that 
identity is often shaped by the misrecognition of others. It would 
be interesting to compare the Dutch attitude in response to the 
challenge posed by Africans’ religious initiatives with the situation 
in other countries of Europe, where different social mechanisms 
exist for the integration of foreigners, due to differences of context. 
France, with its unique tradition of laïcité, is a case in point. 
The difference between the ascribed ethnic identity of African 
Christians, on the one hand, and their religious self-definition, 
on the other, is too important to ignore and leads one to suspect 
underlying motives, of either a religious or a political nature. The 
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insistence by many non-Africans on the existence of a specific 
African identity may be inspired by a concern for religious ortho-
doxy, or it may respond to a need of white Christian communities 
to distinguish themselves from black Christian communities in 
their midst, whom they believe to be different. Politically, the con-
cept of African identity appears to be employed mainly as a way 
of emphasising the perceived existence of ‘alterity’, or the differ-
ence between self and the other, by ascribing to Africans in Europe 
a ‘unique’ ethnic identity. One of the most striking features of 
European politics today is the attempt to erect walls - even literally8 
- between Europe and Africa, and between Europeans and Africans, 
with the objective of preventing the latter from settling permanent-
ly in the West. Even more striking is the emergence of a Europe-
wide official policy based on a consensus that the proper place for 
Africans is in Africa, and not in Europe. To legitimise such a view, 
it is essential to have a theory which justifies the fundamental dif-
ference between the European ‘Self’ and the African ‘Other’. Such 
a theory is advanced, mostly unintentionally, by the tendency of 
intellectuals of various sorts to ascribe a special identity to African 
Christians in Europe derived from their ethnic background, due to 
a long intellectual attachment to the notion of multiculturalism. 
Hence, academic specialists tend to emphasise migrants’ African 
roots, in preference to seeking the meaning of their lives in Europe, 
where they now live. This contributes to the segregation of Africans 
and non-Africans in this part of the world, and also ignores the reli-
gious element in their current identity.  In a different way, this has 
been furthered by a wide-spread public insistence that Africans in 
Europe should develop their ‘own’ - meaning ‘African’ -  identity.9 
This is not to deny that Africans in Europe have such a right; my 
argument is simply that the necessity to promote this should not 
be imposed on them. 
 
The insistence of many non-Africans on the existence of a specific 
African identity, whether inspired by religious orthodoxy or by 
intellectual liberalism, is in effect a continuation of the old colonial 
and early missionary discourse and praxis regarding the perceived 
‘otherness’ of Africans.  I would like to argue not only that the 
definition of identity should result from a process of negotiation in 
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which the people concerned participate (as Taylor also argues), but 
also that the development of an ethnic identity can take place only 
if one’s personal identity, that is the integrity of the individual, has 
been secured. Obviously, the mechanisms for that are influenced by 
the size of a particular minority group vis-à-vis the majority popula-
tion. Africans in Europe are a relatively small minority and have 
little or no power as a group. For many of them, their (Christian) 
religion helps them to achieve a degree of security and inner 
strength which may well encourage them in future to reconsider 
their self-identity specifically in terms of being ‘African’ Christians. 
Or, alternatively, the experience of exclusion, inspired by racism or 
other mechanisms, may have a similar effect. This is the case, for 
example, in the United Kingdom where, due to the circumstances 
of an entirely different context, African and Afro-Caribbean church 
leaders tend to insist on their African identity in the experience of 
their faith. 
Concepts of otherness, like all ideas, have a history, and in the 
case of Europe it is one which not only includes the experiences of 
colonialism and nineteenth-century missionary enterprise, but also 
ideas generated by media reports of more recent events, including 
famines and wars. All of this provides part of the ideological bag-
gage which many Europeans carry with them and which they may 
deploy when they read a description of somebody or something as 
‘African’.  This baggage is a legacy of the past, which cannot simply 
be wished away.  But in applying labels and descriptions today it 
seems important to be aware of the great speed with which Africa 
itself is changing and with which its links with other parts of the 
world are being re-forged, sometimes in surprising ways.
Race and Ethnicity: Spot the Difference
In studying African communities, whether in or outside Africa, 
the scholarly focus is often on ethnicity and ethnic adherence, and 
often at the expense of the religious factor. Why is this so? Or, in 
our case, why is it that Western scholars prefer to single out ethnic-
ity in their efforts to understand the development of the African 
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diaspora in Europe? The focus on ethnicity rather than on religion 
is no doubt partly due to the fact that analysts who themselves 
view the world in secular terms tend to regard religion either as 
a form of false consciousness or at best as a symbol of some other 
force, such as an expression of ethnicity. In a broader sense, it may 
also be a consequence of the fact that African communities, wher-
ever they manifest themselves, are seen as belonging largely to the 
domain of anthropology. So prevalent is the study of ethnicity in 
modern anthropology that a leading American anthropologist, Sally 
Falk Moore, has wondered if, in terms of anthropological theory, 
ethnicity has become the avatar of tribe.  Anthropologists, like 
other Western observers, were until quite recent times accustomed 
to think of Africans as forming political and social groups called 
‘tribes’, and to consider that such groups were a phenomenon char-
acteristic of Africa and other parts of what would later be called 
the developing world. The idea, prevalent until the mid-twentieth 
century, that Africans lived in ‘tribes’ which were the vehicle of 
their ethnic identity, was also a racial one, combined with notions 
of hierarchy and evolution. While the concept of race is no longer 
scientifically respectable, and that of ‘tribe’ is also avoided by many 
social scientists, the concept of ethnicity has come to enjoy wide 
currency.
The concept of ethnicity, in other words, has tended to replace the 
concept of race in the study of African communities in modern 
times, while the content has remained substantially the same.  
Ethnicity, like race, is an elusive concept. Both are essentially mod-
ern notions generated by the global expansion of European socie-
ties since the late fifteenth century when the gradual shrinking of 
the world brought Europeans into contact with human societies 
that seemed strikingly different, and whose difference was most 
obviously noticeable in the colour of their skin (Mason, 1995:5).10 In 
its modern form, the concept of race developed in the eighteenth 
century as one of the products of the Enlightenment and further 
developed into a science of race during the nineteenth century 
when scientific theories came to replace religious beliefs in some 
respects. Thereafter, the process has been well described by the 
British historian Mark Mazower in his book about twentieth-centu-
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ry Europe. The attack on scientific racism, Mazower shows, was par-
ticularly strong in Britain, where some researchers recommended  
already in the 1930s to use the term ‘ethnic group’ rather than 
‘race’ to avoid the latter’s misleading biological associations.  
Given the scientific discrediting of the concept of race, the concept 
of ethnicity provides in principle an alternative way of thinking 
about human diversity as it introduces other categories for defin-
ing differences between human populations. There appears to be 
no consensus as to how to define ethnicity, but most commenta-
tors tend to stress the cultural element. In other words, they tend 
to refer to some sort of cultural distinctiveness as the mark of an 
ethnic group. As always, there are different schools of thought in 
this matter, but an important one seems to adhere to the idea that 
ethnicity is most of all a matter of the processes by which bounda-
ries are created and maintained between different groups. That 
makes it an interesting and relevant question as to by whom and 
how these boundaries are delineated. In modern Europe, when the 
identity of certain social groups thought to be ethnically distinct is 
brought into debate, the delineation is usually ascribed to the wish 
of a particular ethnic or religious minority to preserve or define its 
specific identity. This is usually considered in terms of a specific 
cultural identity, of which religion forms a part. The argument 
I have advanced in the case of African Christian communities in 
the Netherlands suggests the opposite, namely that the drawing of 
boundaries is a conscious or unconscious act on the part of the host 
society and as such the social and intellectual concomitant of the 
current political process of segregating human societies.
The term ‘ethnic’ is often used as synonymous with people who are 
thought of as culturally different, almost as if ‘naturally’ culturally 
different. This is conceived in the absence of clear standards, and 
either ignores or underestimates the importance of non-biological 
elements or mechanisms which are central to defining humans’ 
ability to create culture.11 Its main attraction lies in its usefulness 
in distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’, thus furthering the 
process of ‘othering’.  In practice, as the British sociologist David 
Mason has pointed out, the essential characteristic for membership 
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of a so-called ethnic minority often appears to be the possession of 
a skin which is not ‘white’.  In this way, the equation of cultural 
difference and ethnicity may become an instrument of social and 
political power, as with the designation of race. Or, in sociologi-
cal terms, the attribution of ethnicity to others can thus become 
part of a process of denying the legitimacy of claims on resources 
by those concerned. This, it seems to me, is eminently the case in 
present-day Europe whose main occupation today is the exclusion 
of all who try to come and share in its wealth. 
An Unforeseen Future
Few people would have foreseen the religious changes that are tak-
ing place in Europe as a result of worldwide immigration. While 
secularisation has become a hallmark of modern Western society, 
there has been at the same time an influx of non-Western people 
for whom religion remains a major factor in private and public life. 
This includes Christians from all parts of the world, among whom 
African Christians are the most numerous and visible ones. It also 
includes African Muslims and African adherents of other so-called 
‘world religions’, as well as adherents of so-called African tradition-
al religions.  In view of the modern developments described above, 
the distinction between ‘world’ religions and ‘traditional’ religions 
has become increasingly irrelevant.12 Any objective analysis of the 
religious situation today points to the fact that they should be con-
sidered as belonging to one and the same category, namely that of 
the world’s religions. Rather than becoming weaker or otherwise 
declining in importance the religious traditions of Africa have 
emerged strong and vital in the encounter with the outside world. 
They may, in fact contribute to the ‘re-enchantment’ of Europe, 
where secularisation has been a hallmark of many societies for the 
last few decades. 
It may be useful in this respect to recall some Durkheimian insights 
regarding religion. Durkheim, as is well-known, regards religion - as 
an element of culture - as a social fact, which he believes to share 
the three same basic characteristics with all social facts.13 Thus, 
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religion, as other social facts, is general, that is, common to many 
individuals; it is transmissible, that is, it can be transmitted both 
vertically - from one generation to the other - and horizontally - 
from one contemporary group to the other; and it is compulsory, 
that is, human beings have to take account of religion, whether 
they like it or not: religion is a fact that cannot be ignored. In view 
of this Durkheimian perspective, the idea of disenchantment of the 
world that many observers believed to take place in the second half 
of the twentieth century becomes less plausible. Disenchantment 
has often been seen as a natural process, an inevitable outcome of 
historical evolution. As suggested above, in the case of Africa (as 
well as other parts of the non-Western world) this appears to be a 
wrong assumption, entirely based on an analysis of processes as 
they have unfolded in European history.  It is increasingly appar-
ent that in Africa (and elsewhere) the separation of religion from 
other spheres of life was never more than superficial. Not only is 
Africa reconnecting with its pre-colonial past as regards the role 
of religion in public life, but it is also extending its religious influ-
ence throughout the world.  As a result of the scattering of Africans 
around the globe, its spirit-oriented religious traditions can today 
be found everywhere and in all their spiritual diversity. In Europe, 
they manifest themselves primarily in the form of Christianity and 
Islam, both proselytising religions, but also in the transformation 
of African ‘traditional’ religions into aspiring ‘world’ religions.   
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me restate my argument in a nutshell. Many 
European scholars of Africa have tended to apply Eurocentric analy-
ses of Africa that have obscured the vitality of religion as a constitu-
tive element of African societies in past and present. Africa is not 
in any way re-enchanting, in my view, nor are most other parts of 
the non-Western world.  Any semblance of ‘disenchantment’ in 
those parts of the world appears now to have been a temporary 
phenomenon connected with colonial rule. It is increasingly appar-
ent, for example, that the separation of religion and politics was 
never more than superficial. As a result, non-Western countries, 
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including African ones, are not only reconnecting with their pre-
colonial past as regards the role of religion in public life, but also 
extending their religious influence throughout the world. This is, 
among others, demonstrated in the internationalisation of African-
initiated churches, many of which have been founded in Europe in 
the last few decades. It seems too soon to say what lasting influence 
they may have, but surely they will somehow contribute to what, 
from an African perspective, may be called the re-enchantment of 
Europe. 
‘Enchantment and identity: African Christians in Europe’, Archives 
de sciences sociales des religions, vol. 143, juillet-septembre 2008, pp. 
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Notes
1. Christian migrant communities have so far been largely overlooked in the 
debates concerning the public role of religion.
2. Notably chap. 9. See Ter Haar (2007: 19-27).
3. I am critical of the use of the word “diaspora” in connection with Africans in 
Europe.  I have discussed this at length in Ter Haar (1996, 2004).
4. Platvoet stresses the communication aspect of “religion”. The importance 
of relationships as an analytical concept is also emphasised by the British 
historian Terence O. Ranger in a short article entitled “African traditional 
religion” (1991: 106-14).
5. Ter Haar (1998) provides various examples. In recent years, some well-
known churches with headquarters in Africa have truly inernationalised, 
with branches containing thousands of members in al parts of the world, 
including in Europe. One pertinent example of such “mega-churches” is the 
Redeemed Christian Church of God, which is represented in many European 
countries.
6. Book of Ezekiel, chap. 37, vs. 1-15.
7. These are discussed at length in Ter Haar (1995: 159-70).
8. This notably concerns the Spanish enclaves on the North African coast, 
Ceuta and Melilla, which are both considered weak spots in the defence of 
Fortress Europe. In Ceuta a barbed wire wall was erected around the enclave 
financed by the European Union (Carr, 1997: 61-6). Since then, new and 
higher walls have been erecte to try and put a halt to migration from Africa 
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to Europe. Similar solutions to “illegal” immigration can now be observed all 
over the world.
9. Although due to recent political developments the public outlook on this 
has changed in most European countries, it seems not to have  altered the 
public perception that Africa has basically a “unique” identity associated 
with ethnicity.
10. The whole argument of this author concerning race and ethnicity is based 
on the assumption that these are relational concepts.
11. Note that “culture” is also a much-debated concept and that there is no 
overall consensus as to its precise meaning. Today it is often taken among 
anthropologists to refer to “a class of phenomena, conceptualised for the 
purpose of serving their methodological and scientific needs”.  On the basis 
of that, culture is seen as “composed of patterned 
12. The uncritical use of the term “world religions” has been historically exam-
ined in a recent study by Masuzawa (2005).
13. Or, in the original French: des choses.
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